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State v. Chevron Corp.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

July 22, 2019

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Plaintiff,
v.
CHEVRON CORP. et al., Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          William E. Smith Chief Judge.

         The State of Rhode Island brings this suit against energy companies it says are partly responsible for our once and future climate crisis. It does so under state law and, at least initially, in state court. Defendants removed the case here; the State asks that it go back. Because there is no federal jurisdiction under the various statutes and doctrines adverted to by Defendants, the Court GRANTS the State's Motion to Remand, ECF No. 40.

         I. Background[1]

         Climate change is expensive, and the State wants help paying for it. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12. Specifically from Defendants in this case, who together have extracted, advertised, and sold a substantial percentage of the fossil fuels burned globally since the 1960s. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12, 19, 97. This activity has released an immense amount of greenhouse gas into the Earth's atmosphere, id., changing its climate and leading to all kinds of displacement, death (extinctions, even), and destruction, id. ¶¶ 53, 89-90, 199- 213, 216. What is more, Defendants understood the consequences of their activity decades ago, when transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy would have saved a world of trouble. Id. ¶¶ 106-46; 184-96. But instead of sounding the alarm, Defendants went out of their way to becloud the emerging scientific consensus and further delay changes - however existentially necessary - that would in any way interfere with their multi-billion-dollar profits. Id. ¶¶ 147-77. All while quietly readying their capital for the coming fallout. Id. ¶¶ 178-83.

         Pleading eight state-law causes of action, the State prays in law and equity to relieve the damage Defendants have and will inflict upon all the non-federal property and natural resources in Rhode Island. Id. ¶¶ 225-315. Casualties are expected to include the State's manmade infrastructure, its roads, bridges, railroads, dams, homes, businesses, and electric grid; the location and integrity of the State's expansive coastline, along with the wildlife who call it home; the mild summers and the winters that are already barely tolerable; the State fisc, as vast sums are expended to fortify before and rebuild after the increasing and increasingly severe weather events; and Rhode Islanders themselves, who will be injured or worse by these events. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 15-18, 88-93, 197-218. The State says it will have more to bear than most: Sea levels in New England are increasing three to four times faster than the global average, and many of the State's municipalities lie below the floodplain. Id. ¶¶ 59-61, 76.

         This is, needless to say, an important suit for both sides. The question presently before the Court is where in our federal system it will be decided.

         II. Discussion

         Invented to protect nonresidents from state-court tribalism, 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 (rev. 4th ed. 2018), the right to remove is found in various statutes, which courts have taken to construing narrowly and against removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2009); Rosselló-González v. Calderón-Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 11 (1st. Cir. 2004). Defendants cite several of these in their notice as bases for federal-court jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. None, however, allows Defendants to carry their burden of showing the case belongs here. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) (“[D]efendant must take and carry the burden of proof, he being the actor in the removal proceeding.”).

         A. General Removal

         The first Defendants invoke is the general removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Section 1441 allows a defendant to remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” The species of original jurisdiction Defendants claim exists in this case is federal-question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They argue, in other words, that Plaintiff's case arises under federal law. Whether a case arises under federal law is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). The rule states that removal based on federal-question jurisdiction is only proper where a federal question appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). This rule operationalizes the maxim that a plaintiff is the master of her complaint: She may assert certain causes of action and omit others (even ones obviously available), and thereby appeal to the jurisdiction of her choice. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986); Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392 (“[Plaintiff] may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.”).

         The State's complaint, on its face, contains no federal question, relying as it does on only state-law causes of action. See Compl. ¶¶ 225-315. Defendants nevertheless insist that the complaint is not well-pleaded, and that if it were, it would, in fact, evince a federal question on which to hang federal jurisdiction. Here they invoke the artful-pleading doctrine. “[A]n independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint, ” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983), the artful-pleading doctrine is “designed to prevent a plaintiff from unfairly placing a thumb on the jurisdictional scales, ” López- Muñoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 754 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014). See Wright & Miller, supra, § 3722.1. According to Defendants, the State uses two strains of artifice in an attempt to keep its case in state court: one based on complete preemption, the other on a substantial federal question. See Wright & Miller, supra, § 3722.1 (discussing the three types of case in which the artful pleading doctrine has applied).

         1. Complete Preemption

         Taking these in turn, Defendants first argue - and two district courts have recently held - that a state's public-nuisance claim premised on the effects of climate change is “necessarily governed by federal common law.” California v. BP P.L.C., Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018); accord City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F.Supp.3d 466, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Defendants, in essence, want the Court to peek beneath the purported state-law façade of the State's public-nuisance claim, see the claim for what it would need to be to have a chance at viability, and convert it to that (i.e., into a claim based on federal common law) for purposes of the present jurisdictional analysis. The problem for Defendants is that there is nothing in the artful-pleading doctrine that sanctions this particular transformation.

         The closest the doctrine gets to doing so is called complete preemption. Compare Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Remand 9, ECF No. 87 (“[T]he Complaint pleads claims that arise, if at all, under federal common law . . . .”) and id. at 19 (“[Plaintiff's claims] are necessarily governed by federal common law.”), with Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24 (“[I]f a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily ‘arises under' federal law.”); see also Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., Civil Action No. ELH-18-2357, 2019 WL 2436848, at *6-7 (D. Md. June 20, 2019). Complete preemption is different from ordinary preemption, which is a defense and therefore does not provide a basis for removal, “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14, 24.[2] It is a difference of kind, moreover, not degree: complete preemption is jurisdictional. López-Muñoz, 754 F.3d at 5; Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 919-920 (7th Cir. 2000); Wright & Miller, supra, § 3722.2. When a state-law cause of action is completely preempted, it “transmogrifies” into, Law ...


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