Plaintiff: Glenn Sparr, Esq.
Defendant: Judy Davis, Esq.
this Court is Carlos Guzman's (Petitioner) Application
for Post-Conviction Relief (Application). Petitioner asserts
that his conviction should be vacated because the statute
under which he was convicted in State of Rhode Island v.
Carlos R. Guzman, P1-1993-2782A (the underlying criminal
case) is unconstitutional in that it fails to describe a
crime and prescribe a penalty therein.
Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
10-9.1-1. Having reviewed the parties' memoranda, and for
the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that
Petitioner's conviction was not unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Petitioner's Application is denied.
August 31, 1993, Petitioner was indicted on two counts of
first degree sexual assault under G.L. 1956 §§
11-37-2 and 11-37-3, both of which were alleged to have
occurred on September 5, 1992. On May 17, 1995, Petitioner
pled guilty to both counts. On July 19, 1995, as to each
count, he was sentenced to fifty years, with fifty years to
serve and the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI). The
trial justice ordered the sentences to be served
concurrently. On January 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a previous
application for post-conviction relief, which was denied on
May 24, 2011. Guzman v. State, PM-2011-0075.
October 22, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion
to Vacate Judgment of Conviction in the underlying criminal
case, together with a supporting memorandum asking this Court
to vacate his conviction for first degree sexual assault
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, alleging that his conviction is unconstitutional.
On November 8, 2018, Petitioner's Motion to Vacate was
denied based on the Supreme Court's holding in State
v. Linde, 965 A.2d 415, 416 n.2 (R.I. 2009), in which
the court refused to reach the merits of a constitutional
challenge in the context of a Rule 35 motion to correct an
illegal sentence. On January 24, 2019, by agreement of the
Office of the Attorney General and Petitioner's
court-appointed counsel, this Court ordered Petitioner's
Motion to Vacate to be re-filed as the instant Petition for
the agreement of the Attorney General and by Order dated
February 22, 2019, this Court limited all
arguments to "the constitutionality of a
criminal statute which allegedly fails to state what
constitutes the crime alleged and/or fails to provide for a
penalty thereunder," without the State raising the
affirmative defenses of res judicata and/or
March 9, 2019, Petitioner's court-appointed counsel filed
a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's
Application for Post-Conviction Relief. The State filed an
objection and supporting memorandum thereto on March 29,
2019. On May 24, 2019, the Court provided notice to the State
and Petitioner's court-appointed counsel that
Petitioner's request for relief would be considered by
this Court in the context of a summary disposition. The
parties thereafter acknowledged that an evidentiary hearing
was unnecessary to resolve the issues before this Court.
§ 10-9.1-1, any person who has been convicted of a crime
may file an application for post-conviction relief to
challenge the constitutionality of his or her conviction.
Sec. 10-9.1-1(a)(1). Unlike the proceedings afforded to
Petitioner for his underlying conviction, post-conviction
relief motions are civil in nature. Brown v. State,
32 A.3d 901, 908 (R.I. 2011). Accordingly, the applicant
bears "'the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that such [postconviction] relief is
warranted.'" Motyka v. State, 172 A.3d
1203, 1205 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. State,
45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012)). Additionally, because
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his
conviction, Petitioner has the heightened burden of
demonstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. Beck, 114 R.I. 74, 77, 329 A.2d 190,
ruling on an application for post-conviction relief, if the
court considers matters outside the pleadings, the court
should "treat the [party's] motion as though it were
a motion for summary disposition" as opposed to a motion
to dismiss. Palmigiano v. State, 120 R.I. 402, 406,
387 A.2d 1382, 1385 (1978). As will be discussed, this Court
has considered Petitioner's indictment and plea form,
which are outside the pleadings in the instant civil action.
Accordingly, this Court will review Petitioner's
Application in the context of a summary disposition motion
under § 10-9.1-6(c), which "'closely
resembles' a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Reyes
v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 652 (R.I. 2016) (quoting
Palmigiano, 120 R.I. at 405, 387 A.2d at 1384).
§ 10-9.1-6(c), the court may grant summary disposition
when it finds, based on "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Sec.
10-9.1-6(c). The standard for granting summary disposition on
an application for post-conviction relief is the same as in
granting summary judgment under Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c)-the
"trial justice must consider the affidavits and
pleadings . . . in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is made." Palmigiano,
120 R.I. at 406, 387 A.2d at 1385. The trial justice may not
resolve genuine issues of material fact or adjudge the weight
or credibility of the evidence. Reyes, 141 A.3d at
asserts that his conviction violated his due process rights
under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Rhode
Island Constitution because the single statute of conviction,
§ 11-37-2, fails to state what conduct qualifies as a
crime and fails to provide a penalty. In response, the State
contends that Petitioner cannot prove that § 11-37-2 is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt because Chapter 37
of Title 11 of the Rhode Island General Laws, when read as a
whole, clearly and unambiguously provides a description of
the criminalized conduct and states a penalty.
was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual assault in
violation of § 11-37-2. Section 11-37-2 provides:
"A person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he
or she engages in sexual penetration with another person, and
if any of the following circumstances exist:
"(1) The accused, not being the spouse, knows or has
reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated,