JOSEPH W. WILSON
v.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
For
Plaintiff: Glenn Sparr, Esq.
For
Defendant: Judy Davis, Esq.
DECISION
K.
RODGERS, J.
Before
this Court is Joseph W. Wilson's (Petitioner) Application
for Post-Conviction Relief (Application). Petitioner asserts
that his conviction should be vacated because the statute
under which he was convicted in State of Rhode Island v.
Joseph William Wilson, K1-1998-0170A (the underlying
criminal case) is unconstitutional in that it fails to
describe a crime and prescribe a penalty therein.
This
Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
10-9.1-1. Having reviewed the parties' memoranda, and for
the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that
Petitioner's conviction was not unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Petitioner's Application is denied.
I
Facts
and Travel
On
April 2, 1998, Petitioner was indicted on three counts of
first degree sexual assault under G.L. 1956 §§
11-37-2 and 11-37-3, one count of assault with intent to
commit first degree sexual assault under § 11-37-8, and
one count of burglary under § 11-8-1, all alleged to
have occurred on January 23, 1998. On September 28, 1998,
Petitioner pled nolo contendere to one count of
first degree sexual assault. The remaining counts were
dismissed pursuant to Super. R. Crim. P. 48(a). On February
26, 1999, he was sentenced to fifty years, with thirty years
to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions (the ACI),
the balance of twenty years suspended, with probation and
various other conditions.
On
October 26, 2004, Petitioner filed two previous applications
for post-conviction relief in Wilson v. State,
KM-2004-0935 and Wilson v. State, PM-2004-5796. On
November 9, 2006, Petitioner's applications were denied.
On
October 22, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion
to Vacate Judgment of Conviction in the underlying criminal
case, together with a supporting memorandum asking this Court
to vacate his conviction for first degree sexual assault
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, alleging that his conviction is unconstitutional.
On December 14, 2018, by agreement of the Office of the
Attorney General and Petitioner's court-appointed
counsel, this Court ordered Petitioner's Motion to Vacate
to be converted to the instant Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief in order that his request under Rule 35 would not
suffer the same fate as in State v. Linde, 965 A.2d
415, 416 n.2 (R.I. 2009) (refusing to reach merits of a
constitutional challenge in the context of a Rule 35 motion
to correct an illegal sentence).
With
the agreement of the Attorney General and by Order dated
February 22, 2019, this Court limited all
arguments[1] to "the constitutionality of a
criminal statute which allegedly fails to state what
constitutes the crime alleged and/or fails to provide for a
penalty thereunder," without the State raising the
affirmative defenses of res judicata and/or
laches.
On
March 6, 2019, Petitioner's court-appointed counsel filed
a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's
Application for Post-Conviction Relief. The State filed an
objection and supporting memorandum thereto on April 2, 2019.
On May 24, 2019, the Court provided notice to the State and
Petitioner's court-appointed counsel that
Petitioner's request for relief would be considered by
this Court in the context of a summary disposition. The
parties thereafter acknowledged that an evidentiary hearing
was unnecessary to resolve the issues before this Court.
II
Standard
of Review
Under
§ 10-9.1-1, any person who has been convicted of a crime
may file an application for post-conviction relief to
challenge the constitutionality of his or her conviction.
Sec. 10-9.1-1(a)(1). Unlike the proceedings afforded to
Petitioner for his underlying conviction, post-conviction
relief motions are civil in nature. Brown v. State,
32 A.3d 901, 908 (R.I. 2011). Accordingly, the applicant
bears "'the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that such [postconviction] relief is
warranted.'" Motyka v. State, 172 A.3d
1203, 1205 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. State,
45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012)). Additionally, because
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his
conviction, Petitioner has the heightened burden of
demonstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. Beck, 114 R.I. 74, 77, 329 A.2d 190,
193 (1974).
When
ruling on an application for post-conviction relief, if the
court considers matters outside the pleadings, the court
should "treat the [party's] motion as though it were
a motion for summary disposition" as opposed to a motion
to dismiss. Palmigiano v. State, 120 R.I. 402, 406,
387 A.2d 1382, 1385 (1978). As will be discussed, this Court
has considered Petitioner's indictment and plea form,
which are outside the pleadings in the instant civil action.
Accordingly, this Court will review Petitioner's
Application in the context of a summary disposition motion
under § 10-9.1-6(c), which "'closely
resembles' a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Reyes
v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 652 (R.I. 2016) (quoting
Palmigiano, 120 R.I. at 405, 387 A.2d at 1384).
Under
§ 10-9.1-6(c), the court may grant summary disposition
when it finds, based on "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Sec.
10-9.1-6(c). The standard for granting summary disposition on
an application for post-conviction relief is the same as in
granting summary judgment under Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c)-the
"trial justice must consider the affidavits and
pleadings . . . in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is made." Palmigiano,
120 R.I. at 406, 387 A.2d at 1385. The trial justice may not
resolve genuine issues of material fact or adjudge the weight
or credibility of the evidence. Reyes, 141 A.3d at
653.
III
Analysis
Petitioner
asserts that his conviction violated his due process rights
under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Rhode
Island Constitution because the single statute of conviction,
§ 11-37-2, fails to state what conduct qualifies as a
crime and fails to provide a penalty. In response, the State
contends that Petitioner cannot prove that § 11-37-2 is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt because Chapter 37
of Title 11 of the Rhode Island General Laws, when read as a
whole, clearly and unambiguously provides a description of
the criminalized conduct and states a penalty.
Petitioner
was convicted of one count of first degree sexual assault in
violation of § 11-37-2. Section 11-37-2 provides:
"A person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he
or she engages in sexual penetration with another person, and
if any of the following circumstances exist:
"(1) The accused, not being the spouse, knows or has
reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated,
mentally ...