STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through, PETER NERONHA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff,
PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.; RHODES PHARMACEUTICALS L.P.; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES INC.; RICHARD S. SACKLER; INSYS THERAPEUTICS, INC.; JOHN N. KAPOOR; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; MALLINCKRODT PLC; MALLINCKRODT, LLC; SPECGX, LLC; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.; MCKESSON CORPORATION d/b/a MCKESSON DRUG COMPANY; and AMERISOURCEBERGEN DRUG CORPORATION, Defendants.
Plaintiff: Peter F. Neronha, Esq.; Vincent L. Greene, IV,
Esq.; Robert J. McConnell, Esq.; Kate Menard, Esq.; Donald A.
Migliori, Esq.; Jonathan D. Orent, Esq.
Defendant: Matthew T. Oliverio, Esq.
this Court is a Motion by Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma
Inc., and The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. (collectively
Purdue Defendants or Purdue) for the Court to Reconsider its
May 6, 2019 Order (the Order) granting the State of Rhode
Island's (Plaintiff or the State) Motion to Compel the
Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Purdue (the Deposition).
Alternately, Purdue Defendants move the Court to rule on
their objections to the topics in the State's April 4,
2019 Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) to Purdue
Defendants (the Notice), and to clarify the permissible scope
of the Deposition. The State objects to Purdue's Motion
for Reconsideration and further moves for an order that the
Deposition commence within ten days of the denial of
Purdue's Motion for Reconsideration. Jurisdiction is
pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14 and Super. R. Civ. P.
motion arises from an ongoing matter in which the State, by
and through its Attorney General Peter Neronha,
seeks to recover for damages allegedly caused by the opioid
epidemic from seventeen defendants comprised of opioid
manufacturers, distributors, and two individuals with
executive positions (or former executive positions) at
defendant organizations. For a more thorough recitation of
the facts underlying this dispute, the Court refers readers
to State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. PC-2018-4555,
2018 WL 6074198 (R.I. Super. Nov. 15, 2018).
April 4, 2019, the State noticed Purdue of a Deposition
pertaining to topics related to finance and corporate
structure, pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Purdue
objected to the Notice, to which the State responded with its
intent to file a Motion to Compel. On April 15, 2019, Purdue
moved for a Protective Order from this Court and to Quash the
Notice. In support thereof, Purdue Defendants argued that the
Notice is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information; is
duplicative of information already in the State's
possession; and is unduly burdensome in its scope, timing,
and location. The State objected to Purdue's Motion to
Quash-arguing that the requested Deposition is relevant and
necessary, that it is not duplicative or premature, and that
Purdue Defendants have not cooperated with the State's
requests to meet and confer-and on April 17, 2019, filed a
Cross-Motion to Compel the Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Purdue
Defendants. This Court heard argument on May 1, 2019.
6, 2019, the Court entered an Order granting the State's
Motion to Compel. On May 13, 2019, Purdue moved the Court to
Reconsider its Order under Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In the
alternative, Purdue requested that the Court rule on
Purdue's specific objections to the Notice. On May 16,
2019, the State objected to Purdue's Motion for
The Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure do
not explicitly recognize a motion for reconsideration.
Flanagan v. Blair, 882 A.2d 569, 574 (R.I. 2005).
Rather, the Supreme Court "treat[s] motions for
'reconsideration' . . . as the equivalent of motions
to vacate under Rule 60(b)." Id. at 574 (citing
Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales Univ.,
850 A.2d 912, 916 (R.I. 2004)). Specifically, Rule 60(b)
states, in pertinent part,
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ...