In re Estate of Elizabeth Brown, a/k/a Letizia I. Brown.
Providence County Superior Court (PC 05-2723) Associate
Justice Patricia A. Hurst
For
Appellant: Mary Ryan, Pro Se
For
Appellee: R. J. Connelly, III, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
PER
CURIAM.
The
appellant, Mary Ryan, appeals pro se from an April
26, 2013 final judgment of the Providence County Superior
Court and a June 5, 2013 order of the same court. The April
26, 2013 judgment denied and dismissed Ms. Ryan's probate
appeal and prohibited Ms. Ryan, with significant exceptions,
from "filing pleadings or other documents" in
Superior Court unless they had been signed by a licensed
attorney. The June 5, 2013 order denied Ms. Ryan's
motions to vacate that were filed pursuant to either Rule 59
or Rule 60 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ms. Ryan also raises the issue of the attorneys' fees
awarded to opposing counsel in an April 22, 2013 order of the
Superior Court. Ms. Ryan makes numerous contentions of error
on appeal. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant
to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause
why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily
decided. After a close review of the record and careful
consideration of the parties' arguments (both written and
oral), we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and
that these appeals may be decided at this time.
For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we remand with directions
to modify the April 22, 2013 attorneys' fees order in
accordance with this opinion, we affirm in part and vacate in
part the April 26, 2013 judgment, and we affirm the June 5,
2013 order of the Superior Court.
I
Facts
and Travel
Given
the fact that we reach the ultimate conclusion that Ms.
Ryan's failure to provide this Court with the necessary
transcripts dooms many of her appellate contentions, we shall
provide only those minimal facts necessary to address Ms.
Ryan's contentions.[1] In relating what transpired in the
Burrillville Probate Court and in Ms. Ryan's probate
appeal to the Superior Court, we rely primarily on the trial
justice's August 2, 2012 bench decision.
Ms.
Ryan's case began some fourteen years ago in Probate
Court, where there was a dispute with respect to a
guardianship for Ms. Ryan's aunt, Elizabeth Brown, and,
ultimately, a dispute over Ms. Brown's estate after she
passed away. Ms. Ryan eventually appealed to Superior Court
from an April 27, 2005 denial by the Probate Court of: (1)
her motion for sanctions against opposing
counsel;[2] and (2) her motion to waive the
requirement of a filing of a corporate surety bond, which the
court had imposed as a condition of her becoming
administratrix of the estate. A bench trial on Ms. Ryan's
probate appeal took place in Superior Court commencing on
July 23, 2012 and ending on July 27, 2012. Ms. Ryan has opted
not to provide us with the transcripts of that trial. On
August 2, 2012, the trial justice issued a bench decision
with respect to the probate appeal.
In that
bench decision, the trial justice stated that Ms. Ryan had
requested the court to authorize William Rose, a family
member of Ms. Ryan's and an intervenor in the Superior
Court action, "to stand as surety for Ms. Ryan's
conduct as administratrix and to eliminate the requirement of
corporate surety as required by the Probate Court." In
the words of the trial justice, Ms. Ryan was also appealing
the Probate Court's "refusal to order sanctions
against [opposing counsel] for allegedly bringing a frivolous
guardianship proceeding" with respect to Ms. Brown
before she passed away. The trial justice proceeded to make
factual and credibility findings. The trial justice held,
just as the Probate Court had held, that she would not
sanction opposing counsel for his role in the guardianship
proceedings involving Ms. Brown before her death. She also
questioned Ms. Ryan's standing to bring such a motion for
sanctions. The trial justice proceeded to expressly hold that
"the evidence in this case clearly demonstrates that
corporate surety not only is advisable but it is absolutely
necessary." She further noted that G.L. 1956 §
33-17-1.2 gives the Probate Court the discretion to require
corporate surety and that there are numerous factors to be
considered in making such a determination. Finally, the trial
justice noted that Ms. Ryan had "failed to prove by a
fair preponderance of the evidence that her surety or that of
Mr. Rose would be sufficient."
At the
conclusion of that bench decision, the trial justice noted
that opposing counsel had orally moved at the end of the
trial for sanctions. She found that opposing counsel's
motion had merit. As such, she instructed Ms. Ryan and Mr.
Rose to "show cause why they should not be sanctioned
pursuant to Rule 11 [of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure] and General Laws [1956 §] 9-29-1" and
why the trial justice "should not order them to pay the
reasonable expense of [opposing counsel's] defense of
himself and [his client]." An order memorializing the
bench decision thereafter entered on August 3, 2012.
On
October 4, 2012, opposing counsel filed a "motion for
approval of attorneys' fees and expenses" seeking
attorneys' fees from Ms. Ryan and detailing in an
affidavit and documentation attached thereto data as to his
time spent working on the above-referenced defense, his
hourly billing rate, and the like. Ms. Ryan objected to that
motion.
On
October 18, 2012, Ms. Ryan filed a motion to vacate and
correct the record (the first motion to vacate) seeking to
vacate (presumably pursuant to Rule 60 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure) an order that had entered in the
case on December 15, 2005. That December 15, 2005 order did
the following: (1) it denied Ms. Ryan's motion for
"[c]onditional [i]mmunity;" (2) it denied Ms.
Ryan's motion to assign; (3) it denied Ms. Ryan's
motion for sanctions; (4) it denied Ms. Ryan's motion to
compel/enforce subpoena of the deposition of opposing
counsel; (5) it denied Ms. Ryan's motion to amend and
supplement reasons of appeal; (6) it denied opposing
counsel's motion for a protective order; and (7) it
denied opposing counsel's motion for sanctions. In her
memorandum in support of her motion, she also sought relief
with respect to an order from 2006 that she had presented for
the signature of a justice of the Superior Court (who was not
the trial justice) but which that justice never signed. On
January 25, 2013, after hearing argument on Ms. Ryan's
October 18, 2012 motion to vacate, the trial justice denied
the motion in a bench decision. She stated that Ms. Ryan had
failed to pursue her remedies with respect to those orders
given that "[s]he had years; years to submit the[ ]
orders and get * * * things straightened out." The trial
justice further noted that trial had already taken place and
a decision had been rendered so no useful purpose would be
served in vacating a December 15, 2005 pre-trial order.
In the
meantime, on November 2, 2012, Ms. Ryan had filed a motion to
vacate the Superior Court's order of August 3, 2012
denying her probate appeal (the second motion to vacate),
which motion Ms. Ryan amended on November 5, 2012, on the
grounds that: (1) there was new evidence; (2) the Superior
Court "overlooked evidence and misconceived
information;" and (3) the order was violative of her due
process rights and was unjust.[3] It is unclear from the record
whether Ms. Ryan intended that November 2, 2012 motion to be
filed pursuant to Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure, but that fact has no bearing on the
disposition of this appeal. The trial justice conducted a
hearing on that motion, along with the first motion to
vacate, on January 25, 2013, and she rendered a bench
decision denying the motion on January 28, 2013. An order
entered on June 5, 2013, denying both of Ms. Ryan's
motions to vacate. Ms. Ryan timely appealed from that order.
While
those motions were pending, on November 2, 2012, Ms. Ryan
also filed a motion to disqualify the trial justice. The
trial justice conducted hearings on that motion on November
14 and 21, 2012 and December 11, 2012. On January 4, 2013,
the trial justice denied Ms. Ryan's motion in a bench
decision.
Subsequently,
on April 22, 2013, an amended order entered (the original
February 5, 2013 order previously having been vacated)
approving opposing counsel's October 4, 2012 request for
attorneys' fees and awarding him fees in the amount of
$7, 875. In that amended order, it is represented that a
hearing took place on the matter of attorneys' fees on
February 1, 2013. Ms. Ryan has opted not to provide us with
the complete transcript of that hearing.
Subsequently,
on March 4, 2013, Ms. Ryan filed her objection to Rule 11
sanctions, in response to the court's original August 3,
2012 order directing her to show cause why she should not be
sanctioned and held liable for "reasonable costs"
in the case. Ultimately, an order imposing sanctions entered
against Ms. Ryan on April 26, 2013, prohibiting her
"from filing pleadings or other documents in the State
of Rhode Island Superior Court unless they have been signed,
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, by a licensed attorney, admitted to practice in
Rhode Island[.]" The order also provided significant
exceptions to that prohibition, stating:
"a. Ms. Ryan may apply to Presiding Justice of the
Superior Court, in writing and with notice to all interested
parties, for leave to proceed in a self-represented capacity
and to sign and file pleadings and other documents on her own
behalf;
"b. Ms. Ryan is permitted to proceed in a
self-represented capacity and to sign and file pleadings and
other documents on her own behalf in connection with an
appeal of any order or final judgment entered in this case;
"c. Ms. Ryan is permitted to proceed in a
self-represented capacity and to sign and file pleadings and
other documents on her own behalf in any legal action in
which she is a named defendant or is permitted by the
Presiding Justice of the Superior Court, upon written motion
with notice to all parties and hearing, to intervene as a
party defendant and to act in a self-represented capacity;
"d. Ms. Ryan is permitted to proceed in a
self-represented capacity and to sign and file pleadings and
other documents on her own behalf in any presently pending
legal action in which she has, previous to the date of this
Order, filed a written entry of her appearance ...