Providence County Superior Court (PC 17-1029) Associate
Justice Maureen B. Keough
For
Plaintiff: Brittanee N. Bland, Esq. Thomas C. Plunkett, Esq
For
Defendant: Stephen A. Izzi, Esq. Tenessa H. Azar, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
PAUL
A. SUTTELL CHIEF JUSTICE
This
case involves a question of statutory interpretation of the
ancient mortgages statute, G.L. 1956 § 34-26-7. The
defendant, Providence Business Loan Fund, Inc. (PBLF or
defendant), appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (Bayview or
plaintiff), following the grant of the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment. The defendant argues that the hearing
justice erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment because, by statute, the defendant holds a
valid mortgage on the property on which the defendant
commenced foreclosure proceedings. This case came before the
Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to
appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal
should not be summarily decided. After considering the
parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the
record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that
this case may be decided without further briefing or
argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
On June
2, 1992, Norris Waldron (Waldron) granted a mortgage to PBLF,
which was at that time known as "Providence Economic
Development Corporation," with respect to certain real
property located in Providence (the property), as security
for a loan in the amount of $70, 660 (the 1992 mortgage). The
1992 mortgage stated a term of ten years, but it did not
specify a maturity date; it was recorded in the Providence
land evidence records at Book 2568, Page 50, on June 3, 1992.
On December 20, 1996, Waldron entered into a
"Modification Agreement" with defendant to reduce
the amount of debt to $44, 061.75, to be repaid over a period
of 108 months, beginning on January 1, 1997 (the modification
agreement). The modification agreement was not recorded. On
the same day, Waldron and defendant also executed an
amendment to the 1992 mortgage (the 1997 amendment), which
was recorded on January 3, 1997, in the Providence land
evidence records. The 1997 amendment states, in relevant
part, that the 1992 mortgage "has been modified, with
the consent of mortgagor, by an agreement of even date
herewith, to modify the terms and to extend the maturity date
of said indebtedness to reduce the amount of the indebtedness
which is secured by said mortgage to $44, 061.75." On
its face, the 1997 amendment failed to reflect the 108-month
term listed in the modification agreement and it did not
specify any other term or maturity date.
On
January 23, 2004, Waldron conveyed the property to Jocelyn
Waldron by quitclaim deed. On June 21, 2014,
Jocelyn[1] granted a mortgage on the property to
MERS, as nominee for Equity One, Inc., which was recorded in
the Providence land evidence records. Three years later,
Jocelyn paid off that debt using the proceeds of a loan from
Global Equity Lending, Inc., which was secured by a mortgage
on the property; that mortgage was assigned by Global Equity
Lending, Inc. to plaintiff on June 19, 2007, and an
assignment of the mortgage and security agreement was
recorded in the Providence land evidence records.
Jocelyn
later conveyed the property to Broad Street, LLC by warranty
deed on October 29, 2014. On February 8, 2017, defendant gave
notice to Broad Street, LLC of its commencement of
foreclosure proceedings on the 1992 mortgage. On March 6,
2017, plaintiff, as a lienholder on the property, filed a
complaint in Superior Court seeking a declaration that
defendant's mortgage had been discharged under §
34-26-7, which provides for the expiration of certain
mortgages after a stated number of years, and that,
therefore, defendant had no right to foreclose on the
property.[2]
On May
17, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the 1992 mortgage expired and was discharged by
statute on June 3, 2007. The plaintiff further argued that,
even if the 1997 amendment had properly extended the
mortgage, it would have expired in 2011 and was therefore no
longer enforceable under the statute. The defendant countered
that, because the 1992 mortgage did not state a maturity date
on its face, a thirty-five-year lien was created under the
statute. Alternatively, defendant argued that the 1997
amendment was valid because it was recorded and, because the
1997 amendment failed to state a term or maturity date, the
mortgage was valid for thirty-five years from the date of the
1997 amendment.
The
hearing justice found the 1997 amendment to be a
"non-compliant mortgage extension, which is ineffective
under the statute," and thus she considered the 1992
mortgage to be the operative document. The hearing justice
further found, after giving the words of the statute their
"plain and ordinary meaning," that defendant's
mortgage had expired because the 1992 mortgage stated a term
of ten years and, because the statute allows for exercise of
the power of sale only five years following that term, the
mortgage had expired in 2007. Accordingly, the hearing
justice granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 24,
2017.
II
Standard of Review
"This
Court reviews a hearing justice's grant of a motion for
summary judgment de novo." Pineda v. Chase
Bank USA, N.A., 186 A.3d 1054, 1056 (R.I. 2018).
"We will affirm a [trial] court's decision only if,
after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Cancel v.
City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 350 (R.I. 2018)
(quoting Newstone Development, LLC v. East Pacific,
LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103 (R.I. 2016)). "Furthermore,
the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent
evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact
and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the
pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions."
Id. (quoting Newstone Development, LLC, 140
A.3d at 103). "[S]ummary judgment should enter against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case *
...