United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
WAYNE A. SILVA, Plaintiff,
ROBERT M. FARRELL, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
December 3, 2018, Plaintiff Wayne A. Silva filed pro
se a four-page, handwritten complaint suing the Clerk of
the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, Robert M. Farrell. Accompanying the complaint
is a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”), ECF No. 2, which has been referred to me
for determination. Because of the IFP motion, this complaint
is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
the second case Plaintiff has filed in the District of Rhode
Island in 2018; like the first,  the new complaint
appears to be based on Plaintiff's ongoing
frustration arising from his inability to execute on five
“defaults” against defendants obtained in 2014
for amounts exceeding $2 million in an action apparently
filed in Massachusetts state court in 2013. Before beginning
his filings in this District, Plaintiff filed for the same
relief in the District of Massachusetts. This effort was
unsuccessful and culminated in the entry of an Order of
injunction by Judge F. Dennis Saylor of the Massachusetts
District Court prohibiting Plaintiff from filing anything
further in the Massachusetts case except for a notice of
appeal. Thornton/Massachusetts, ECF No. 7 at 2.
According to the instant complaint, ECF No. 1 at 1, and
confirmed by the public docket in
Thornton/Massachusetts, after the entry of Judge
Saylor's Order, Plaintiff twice attempted to file
documents in Thornton/Massachusetts, once in
February 2018 and once in October 2018.
Thornton/Massachusetts, ECF Nos. 8 & 9. In
compliance with Judge Saylor's Order, both attempted
filings were returned to Plaintiff by the Office of the
Clerk. The newest Rhode Island complaint, which names the
Massachusetts Clerk of Court, appears to be based, at least
in part, on this conduct. Plaintiff alleges that this
violates the First Amendment and amounts to racketeering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The pleading asserts,
“So Farrell Clerk wants me to be desperate, not secure
in funds so as to take loss [been 12 years].” ECF No. 1
at 4 (brackets in original).
Thornton/Rhode Island, Chief Judge Smith adopted my
recommendation that that case be dismissed. ECF No. 12. Among
other reasons, the Court held that the pleading failed to
state a claim, that there was no subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent
that Plaintiff was seeking to relitigate or reopen a
Massachusetts state court case, as well as that venue is not
proper in the District of Rhode Island because all parties
reside in Massachusetts and all events giving rise to the
claim occurred in Massachusetts. ECF No. 4 at 2-3. Following
dismissal of Thornton/Rhode Island, as he had done
in Thornton/Massachusetts, Plaintiff filed a series
of repetitive and frivolous motions. In a report and
recommendation that issued on August 21, 2018, I recommended
that all of them be denied, as well as that the Court enter
the same injunction as is already in place in Massachusetts,
barring Plaintiff from making further filings in the case
(except for a direct appeal) without leave of a judge of this
Court. ECF No. 19. That recommendation is currently pending
before Chief Judge Smith.
on the new complaint, I recommend that it be dismissed
because it suffers from most of the same issues that doomed
Thornton/Rhode Island: the failure to state a
coherent claim; the failure to overcome the jurisdictional
barrier posed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the
extent that Plaintiff is still seeking to relitigate the
Massachusetts state court case; and the failure to establish
that venue is proper. I also recommend summary dismissal of
this case because the pleading suffers from yet another fatal
deficit. It is well settled that a clerk of court acting in
that capacity is protected by the same judicial immunity from
suit that protects judicial officers acting in their judicial
capacity. Uzamere v. United States, No. CA 13-505 S,
2013 WL 5781216, at *8 (D.R.I. Oct. 25, 2013),
aff'd, No. 13-2454 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Court
clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity, derivative of
their judges' immunity, to the extent that they are
alleged to be liable for carrying out the judges'
directives.”). Here, Plaintiff is suing Clerk Farrell
for complying with Judge Saylor's Order barring Plaintiff
from filing except for a notice of appeal (which Plaintiff
has not attempted to file). Because the Clerk is immune from
such a claim, the complaint should be summarily dismissed.
See Funches v. Bucks Cty., 586 Fed.Appx. 864, 868
(3d Cir. 2014) (clerk's office personnel entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity following judge's facially valid
order not to file documents in a case over which he was
on the foregoing, I recommend that the complaint be summarily
dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, venue in
this Court is improper and the only defendant is immune from
suit. Consistent with this recommendation, I further
recommend that the IFP motion be denied as moot.
important coda: Plaintiff has now filed two frivolous
complaints in this Court, with the second suffering most of
the same deficits as the first, which in turn mirrored a near
identical case dismissed in the District of
Massachusetts. Based on this conduct, Plaintiff is
cautioned that, if he continues to file frivolous new cases
seemingly for the purpose of circumventing a court order
barring filings in an existing case, the Court may enter a
broader order, barring him from filing anything in this
Court, except for a notice of appeal, unless he has first
obtained leave to do so from a judge of this Court. See
Noble v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 297
F.Supp.3d 998, 1009-16 (D.S.D. 2018); Lundahl v. Nar
Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d 855, 855-61 (D. Idaho 2006)
(Tallman, J., sitting by designation). At this point, I do
not make that recommendation.
objection to this report and recommendation must be specific
and must be served and filed with the Clerk of the Court
within fourteen (14) days after its service on the objecting
party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); DRI LR Cv 72(d).
Failure to file specific objections in a timely manner
constitutes waiver of the right to review by the district
judge and the right to appeal the Court's decision.
See United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 14
(1st Cir. 2008); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980).
 The first case is Silva v.
Thornton, C.A. No. 18-095WES (hereinafter
 Chief Judge Smith found
Plaintiff's filings in Thornton/Rhode Island to
be “barely comprehensible.” E.g., ECF
No. 12 at 1 (describing Plaintiff's objection to report
and recommendation). The new complaint similarly borders on
incoherent. Nevertheless, the Court has read it with the
leniency applicable to all pro se filings.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
 The Massachusetts case is Silva v.
Thornton, C.A. No. 17-12106-FDS (hereinafter
 Between Thornton/Rhode Island
and Thornton/Massachusetts, there are several
opinions setting out analysis and citing to the relevant
authorities. Thornton/Rhode Island, ECF Nos. 4, 12
& 19; Thornton/Massachusetts, ECF Nos. 4 &
7. The reader's familiarity with those opinions is