United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
August 9, 2018, Plaintiff Richer Gosselin filed a pro
se complaint and a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1 & 2.
The IFP motion was referred to me. Because of Plaintiff's
IFP application, I conducted a preliminary screening of the
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and issued a report
and recommendation (“R”). ECF No. 5; see
Gosselin v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, C.A. No.
18-438WES, 2018 WL 4629248, at *1 (D.R.I. Sept. 27, 2018). In
the R, I highlighted deficiencies in Plaintiff's
pleading and recommended providing Plaintiff leave to amend
so he could fix those problems within thirty days.
Gosselin, 2018 WL 4629248, at *2-3. I also noted
that Plaintiff's IFP application was
deficient and recommended that he be afforded a
similar period to cure. Id. at *2. Plaintiff filed
no objection to the R and the time for him to do so has now
passed. The R is currently pending before the District
meantime, Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint and a
second IFP motion. ECF Nos. 6 & 7. The second IFP motion
has been referred to me; unlike the first, it is complete and
establishes Plaintiff's eligibility for IFP status.
However, I have also reviewed the amended
complaint. I find it does not cure the deficiencies I
determined were present in the original
complaint. The amended complaint has some minor
changes; for example, it corrects previous errors in
interchangeably referring to Plaintiff as the Defendant, and
vice versa. See ECF No. 6. Nonetheless,
Plaintiff's submission is still “[s]prawling and
internally confusing, ” and it consists almost entirely
of superficial legal conclusions. Gosselin, 2018 WL
4629248, at *2. Most importantly, apart from Plaintiff's
alleged tribal status, which is insufficient as a matter of
law, it still fails to state any plausible facts or viable
legal theory for challenging the foreclosure of
Plaintiff's property. These flaws are fatal, and it is
not a court's duty to “mine a lengthy complaint
searching for nuggets that might refute obvious pleading
deficiencies.” Id. (citing Neubauer v.
FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2017)).
on the foregoing, I recommend that Plaintiff's amended
complaint (ECF No. 6) be summarily dismissed for failing to
state a claim due to its failure to cure the deficiencies
identified in the R. Consequently, I recommend denying
Plaintiff's IFP motions (ECF Nos. 2 & 7) as moot. Any
objection to this report and recommendation must be specific
and must be served and filed with the Clerk of the Court
within fourteen (14) days after its service on the objecting
party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); DRI LR Cv 72(d).
Failure to file specific objections in a timely manner
constitutes waiver of the right to review by the district
judge and the right to appeal the Court's decision.
See United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 14
(1st Cir. 2008); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980).
 The critical second page of the form
was missing. Through the filing of an “affidavit of
exempt filing status, ” Plaintiff also relied on the
unfounded proposition that his tribal membership alone
exempts him from paying the Court's filing fee. This
argument is without merit. Banks v. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 5:07-CT-3037-H, 2010 WL 2232941, at *1
(E.D. N.C. June 3, 2010). He filed a similar
“affidavit” with his new IFP motion. It will not
be discussed further.
 Because of Plaintiff's pro
se status, I have liberally construed his papers.
See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Instituto de
Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
 One additional deficiency must be
mentioned - the amended complaint, like the original,
mentions “Richere Gosselin” as a possible second
named plaintiff, who is described in the first sentence of
the pleadings as “wife.” ECF Nos. 1 at 1 & 6
at 1. However, only Plaintiff Richer Gosselin has signed the
pleadings and therefore only he is a party. As a pro
se litigant, he cannot represent the interests of
others. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such
courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein.”); DRI LR Gen 205(a)(2) (“[a]n
individual appearing pro se may not represent any other