United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
SAMSON P. PAYE, Plaintiff,
ASHBEL T. WALL, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
William E. Smith Chief Judge.
before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff Samson P.
Paye (“Plaintiff” or “Paye”), a
prisoner at the Adult Correctional Institutions
(“ACI”), has brought a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Ashbel
T. Wall, Warden Matthew Kettle, Lieutenant William Galligan,
and Lieutenant Joshua Macomber (collectively
“Defendants”), all of whom are sued in their
individual and official capacities. Defendants seek dismissal
of the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because it
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For
the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
an inmate at the ACI in Cranston, Rhode Island. Defendants
are officials and/or officers at the ACI. In his pro se
Complaint, Paye alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, Rhode Island constitutional and/or statutory
law, and Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
policy. In brief, Paye alleges that he was held in
segregation for seven additional days without due process,
was denied visitation with his mother during this time, and
was also denied commissary privileges. He seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and
costs. Paye also asks that the Court exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims.
March 8, 2017, Paye received a “booking” for
assaulting another inmate and was taken to segregation. At
his hearing before the disciplinary board the following day,
Paye was found guilty of the infraction and given thirty-one
days of segregation and thirty-one days' loss of good
time as punishment. According to Paye, his time in
segregation expired on April 7, 2017, but he was not released
from segregation on that day, with no explanation or due
process. Also on April 7, 2017, Paye was denied visitation
with his elderly mother, who had taken the bus from
Providence to see him. In addition, Defendants refused to let
him have his commissary order.
filed a grievance regarding these events on April 9, 2017. On
April 13, 2017, he wrote letters to Director Wall, Warden
Kettle, Assistant Director James Weeden, and Department
Grievance Coordinator Cory Cloud, complaining about being
kept in segregation past his release date, denied visitation
with his mother, and denied commissary privileges. On April
14th, Paye was moved out of segregation without an
explanation either for his release or for the seven extra
days of confinement in segregation. Paye's grievance was
filed the instant Complaint on April 28, 2017.Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss was filed on March 29, 2018. Thereafter,
Paye filed two responses (“First Response, ” ECF
No. 25; “Second Response, ” ECF No. 27) to the
Motion to Dismiss. Defendants subsequently filed a response
in support of the Motion to Dismiss (“Defendants'
Response in Support, ” ECF No. 28).
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, see
Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27
(1st Cir. 1994), taking all well-pleaded allegations as true
and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences, see Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); Carreiro v.
Rhodes Gill & Co., 68 F.3d 1443, 1446 (1st Cir.
1995). “[I]f, under any theory, the allegations are
sufficient to state a cause of action in accordance with the
law, ” the motion to dismiss must be denied.
Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st.
plaintiff need not plead factual allegations in great detail,
the allegations must be sufficiently precise to raise a right
to relief beyond mere speculation. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007)(abrogating the
“no set of facts” rule of Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957)). “The complaint
must allege ‘a plausible entitlement to relief' in
order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Thomas v.
Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir.
2008)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)
(“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”). The Court of Appeals has cautioned that the
“plausibility” requirement is not akin to a
“standard of likely success on the merits, ” but,
instead, “the standard is plausibility assuming the
pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff's
favor.” Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of
Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010).
considering a motion to dismiss a prisoner's claim that
his constitutional rights have been violated, the court must
be guided by the principle that, while “prison
officials are to be accorded substantial deference in the way
they run their prisons, this does not mean that we will
rubber stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison
administrators.” Spratt v. R.I. Dep't of
Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, this Court
has liberally reviewed Plaintiff's allegations and legal
claims since they have been put forth by a pro se litigant.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).