United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH CHIEF JUDGE
Defendant/Movant
David Lasseque has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(“Motion to Vacate”) (ECF No. 102) in the
above-captioned matter. The Government has objected to the
Motion. (See Resp. in Opp'n to Mot. to Vacate
(“Resp.”) (ECF No. 104).) The Court has
determined that no hearing is necessary. For the reasons that
follow, the Motion is DENIED.
I.
Background and Travel
Following
a two-day jury trial, on June 24, 2014, Lasseque was found
guilty of one count of bank robbery and one count of
conspiracy to commit bank robbery. (Mot. to Vacate 1.) He was
sentenced on September 26, 2014, to a total of 140
months' imprisonment, to be followed by three years of
supervised release. (Id.)
Lasseque
appealed, arguing that the Court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal and in imposing certain sentencing
enhancements. (Id. at 2.) In a Judgment issued on
November 18, 2015, the First Circuit denied the appeal.
(Id.) The appellate court's Mandate issued on
December 10, 2015. The United States Supreme Court
subsequently denied Lasseque's petition for writ of
certiorari. (Mot. to Vacate 2.)
On
September 21, 2016, [1] Lasseque timely filed the instant Motion.
(Id. at 13.)
II. Law
A.
Section 2255
Section
2255 provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Generally,
the grounds justifying relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)
are limited. A court may grant relief pursuant to § 2255
in instances where the court finds a lack of jurisdiction, a
constitutional error, or a fundamental error of law.
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1979). “[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for
collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted
‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice.'” Id.
(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962)). Moreover, § 2255 is not a substitute for direct
appeal. Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772
(1st Cir. 1994)(citations omitted).
B.
Procedural Default
“Where
a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to
raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas
only if the defendant can first demonstrate either
‘cause' and actual ‘prejudice,' or that
he is ‘actually innocent'” of the crimes for
which he was convicted. Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)(internal citations omitted); see
also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
“[C]ause” consists of “some objective
factor external to the defense . . . .”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488; see also Coleman,
501 U.S. at 753 (noting that the Carrier Court
“explained clearly that ‘cause' under the
cause and prejudice test must be something external
to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed
to him”). In order to demonstrate prejudice, “the
[h]abeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the
errors at . . . trial created a possibility of
prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions.'”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982))(alteration in
original); see also Derman v. United States, 298
F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 2002)(“The showing of prejudice
needed to cure a procedural default generally requires a
habeas petitioner to demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been
different absent the error. The question is not whether the
petitioner, qua defendant, would more likely have
received a different verdict had the error not occurred, but
whether he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
worthy of confidence, notwithstanding the
bevue.”)(internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). The “actual innocence” standard
established by the Supreme Court in Carrier
“requires the habeas petitioner to show that a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (quotation marks
omitted). To establish the requisite probability, “a
petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. Moreover, a credible
claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to
support his allegations of constitutional error with new
reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical
physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.”
Id. at 324. “‘[A]ctual innocence'
means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623.
C.
Strickland
The
Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Lema v. United States, 987
F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993)(citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). However,
“[t]he Constitution does not guarantee a defendant a
letter-perfect defense or a successful defense; rather, the
performance standard is that of reasonably effective
assistance under the circumstances then obtaining.”
United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309-10 (1st
Cir. 1991).
A
defendant who claims that he was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate:
(1) that [his] counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness[; and]
(2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. In assessing
the adequacy of counsel's performance, a defendant
“‘must identify the acts or omissions of counsel
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment,' and the court then determines
whether, in the particular context, the identified conduct or
inaction was ‘outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.'” United States v.
Manon, 608 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2010)(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). With respect to the
prejudice requirement under Strickland, a
“reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. In making the prejudice
assessment, [the court] focus[es] on the fundamental fairness
of the proceeding.” Id. (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). “Unless a defendant makes
both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . .
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687; see also Reyes-Vejerano v. United
States, 117 F.Supp.2d 103, 106 (D.P.R. 2000)(“The
petitioner has the burden of proving both prongs of this
test, and the burden is a heavy one.”). “The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just result.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
Strickland
instructs that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential.” Id.
at 689; see also Id. (“It is all too tempting
for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy
for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has
proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or
omission of counsel was unreasonable.”). The court
“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.'” Id. (quoting Michel v.
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Moreover,
“[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of
a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment.” Id. at 691. Finally, “[a]
fair ...