State of Rhode Island, by and through Attorney General Peter Kilmartin
v.
Rhode Island Troopers Association.
Providence County Superior Court (PC 17-918) Netti C. Vogel
Associate Justice.
For
Plaintiff: Department of Attorney General: Rebecca T.
Partington Michael W. Field Chrisanne Wyrzykowski
For
Defendant: Michael B. Forte, Jr., Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
MAUREEN MCKENNA GOLDBERG JUSTICE.
This
case of first impression is before the Supreme Court on
appeal by the defendant, the Rhode Island Troopers
Association (RITA), from a judgment granting declaratory and
equitable relief in favor of the plaintiff, the State of
Rhode Island (the state). The Superior Court declared that
the Governmental Tort Liability Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 31 of
title 9, vests the Attorney General with the nondelegable,
nontransferable legal duty to determine whether the state
should provide a defense and indemnification in a civil
action brought against a state employee. The Superior Court
also permanently enjoined arbitration of issues related to
the Attorney General's decision to decline to provide a
defense and indemnification for Rhode Island State Trooper
James Donnelly-Taylor (Trooper Taylor) in a pending federal
civil rights action brought against him in his individual
capacity. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the
first six declarations and vacate the remaining two
declarations in the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts
and Travel
This
case stems from an incident that occurred on February 26,
2014, when two members of the Rhode Island State Police,
Trooper Taylor and Trooper Gregory Palmer (Trooper Palmer),
initiated a traffic stop of Lionel Monsanto (Monsanto) after
observing him speeding in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. When the
officers learned that Monsanto's driver's license had
expired, he was arrested and transported to the State Police
Lincoln Barracks for processing.[1]After he was processed and
booked, Monsanto was escorted to a cellblock. It was then
that Trooper Taylor is alleged to have entered the cellblock
and physically assaulted Monsanto multiple times. This
incident was captured on a video recording that graphically
depicts the foregoing episode.[2] The events of that evening were
presented to a grand jury. Trooper Taylor was indicted on a
charge of assault, to which he subsequently entered a plea of
nolo contendere. During his plea colloquy, Trooper Taylor
knowingly waived his constitutional rights and admitted to
the underlying facts in the indictment, including that he
assaulted Monsanto. A judge of the Sixth Division District
Court accepted the plea and ordered the case to be filed in
accordance with G.L. 1956 § 12-10-12. Trooper Taylor
also was ordered to perform twenty-five hours of community
service work. The criminal disposition subsequently was
expunged in accordance with § 12-10-12(c). No criminal
record resulted from this disposition.
On
March 24, 2016, Monsanto filed suit against the following
defendants in the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island: the State of Rhode Island; Trooper
Taylor, individually and in his official capacity; Trooper
Palmer, individually and in his official capacity; the Rhode
Island State Police; and Colonel Steven G. O'Donnell,
individually and in his official capacity. Mr. Monsanto
alleged federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; conspiracy to violate plaintiff's civil
rights; assault and battery; malicious prosecution; false
imprisonment and false arrest; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and violations of G.L. 1956 § 9-1-35
and G.L. 1956 § 31-21.2-3, [3] causes of action based on
alleged racial harassment by racial profiling. The complaint
also seeks punitive damages.
On
April 8, 2016, the Attorney General received a written
request for representation from Trooper Taylor. This request
stated, in pertinent part:
"I respectfully request legal representation and
indemnification with regard to the * * * civil action filed
[by Monsanto]. If the Attorney General is unable to represent
me, I request that private counsel be engaged by the State to
represent me in this matter. This request is in accordance
with the RIGL, to include but not limited to, 42-28-20, and
the Rhode Island State Police Troopers Association Collective
Bargaining Agreement, section 29.17."
On May
15, 2016, the Department of the Attorney General responded:
"Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-9 and your plea
of no contest to assault, a determination has been made by
the Attorney General that due to allegations raised in the
Complaint-most notably, but not limited to, the intentional
torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress-that the State is not legally obligated to
provide you with legal representation for any cause of action
filed against you in your individual capacity. Hence, the
Attorney General will not represent you for any allegations
raised in counts two through eight of the Complaint."
However,
the Attorney General is representing Trooper Taylor in his
official capacity. An affidavit also was submitted to the
Superior Court by the Department of the Attorney General that
stated, in relevant part:
"Prior to making the determination in 2016 that the
State of Rhode Island would not defend or indemnify James
Donnelly Taylor in the federal action Monsanto v. State,
et al., No. 16-0147, the Department of Attorney General
had available to it: information from the criminal
proceedings in State v. Lionel Monsanto, including
reports from the Rhode Island State Police; information from
the criminal proceedings in State v. James Donnelly Taylor,
including reports, a video of the incident at the Lincoln
Barracks in February of 2014, and the fact that Donnelly
Taylor was indicted by a grand jury and later pled nolo
contendere in the Sixth District Court to a charge of
misdemeanor assault on Monsanto. There was also privileged
communication and exchange of information between the
Department of Attorney General and the Department of Public
Safety."
The
Attorney General's refusal to provide a defense to
Trooper Taylor in his individual capacity was based on the
Attorney General's determination that Trooper
Taylor's conduct fell "outside the scope of his
employment" and amounted to willful misconduct in
accordance with §§ 9-31-8 and 9-31-9, provisions of
the Governmental Tort Liability Act.[4] The RITA filed a grievance
on Trooper Taylor's behalf with the State Police alleging
a violation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), specifically, Article 29.17.[5] In that grievance, RITA
asserted that the state must
"honor its contractual obligations contained in Article
29.17 and shall provide Trooper Donnelly Taylor with full
legal defense of all claims asserted in Monsanto v. State
of Rhode Island et al., and shall also provide Trooper
Donnelly Taylor with full indemnification for all
liabilities, expenses and damages of any nature resulting
from that legal action."
Thus,
through the grievance and a subsequent demand for
arbitration, RITA sought to compel the state to comply with
the terms of the CBA by funding a legal defense for Trooper
Taylor in the federal action and indemnify him against any
damages that might be awarded to Monsanto and against Trooper
Taylor, including punitive damages.
On June
3, 2016, the State Police denied RITA's grievance based
on the Attorney General's refusal to represent Trooper
Taylor in his individual capacity. On June 30, 2016, RITA
filed a "Demand for Arbitration" and sought the
following remedy:
"A determination that the State honor its obligations
contained in Article 29.17; that the State provide Trooper
Donnelly-Taylor with full legal defense of all claims
asserted against him in Monsanto v. State of Rhode Island
et al. and/or full indemnification for all liabilities,
expenses and damages of any nature resulting from that legal
action; that the State shall be directed to reimburse to
Trooper Donnelly-Taylor all legal fees and expenses incurred
by him with respect to the representation in that legal
action; and that the State reimburse the Rhode Island State
Troopers Association for any damages it suffered as a result
of the State's flagrant violation of Article 29.17."
Based
upon an agreed statement of facts filed by the parties in
Superior Court, it is undisputed that the arbitrator, at the
request of RITA, issued a subpoena seeking thirty-one
categories of documents. The state did not make the requested
production, but instead sought to have the subpoena quashed.
Monsanto thereafter filed a third amended complaint in the
federal court action; and Trooper Taylor, in his individual
capacity, responded by filing a cross-claim and a third-party
complaint against the Governor of Rhode Island, the General
Treasurer of Rhode Island, and the Director of the Department
of Administration, all in their official capacities; the
Attorney General, in his individual and official capacities;
and then-colonel of the State Police Steven G. O'Donnell,
in his individual and official capacities.[6] Although Trooper
Taylor's third-party complaint and cross-claim raised
numerous allegations, the case on appeal before this Court
centers on the claims arising from the Attorney General's
refusal to defend and indemnify Trooper Taylor in his
individual capacity in that federal action.[7]
On
February 27, 2017, the state filed a "Verified Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" in the Superior
Court that requested, inter alia, preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief against the arbitration of
RITA's grievance; a declaration that the grievance is not
arbitrable; and a declaration that the Governmental Tort
Liability Act "tasks the Attorney General with the
non-delegable, non-transferable, sole legal duty to determine
when and whether, in an action filed against a state
employee, to provide a defense and/or
indemnification[.]" The state also sought a declaration
that Article 29.17 of the CBA is valid only when read in
conjunction with the Governmental Tort Liability Act. On
March 28, 2017, a justice of the Superior Court granted
temporary injunctive relief and stayed the arbitration.
On June
20, 2017, another hearing was held before a second trial
justice of the Superior Court regarding the request for
declaratory relief, based upon an agreed statement of facts.
On July 6, 2017, the trial justice issued a judgment with
eight declarations that generally mirror the state's
request for relief. The judgment declares:
"A. Any further activity and arbitration proceedings
related in any way to Defendant RITA's Demand for
Arbitration * * * is permanently stayed and the Defendant
[RITA] is temporarily, preliminarily and permanently enjoined
from participating in any way in any further related
proceedings;
"B. The issues submitted by Defendant RITA are not
substantively arbitrable under the terms of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the parties or under the Rhode
Island constitution or General Laws;
"C. The Governmental Tort Liability Act tasks the
Attorney General with the non-delegable, non-transferable,
sole legal duty to determine when and whether, in an action
filed against a state employee, to provide a defense and/or
indemnification, however this declaration is made without
prejudice to any future litigant who wishes to challenge any
portion of the statute as unclear or ambiguous or any party
who seeks a construction of the language by the courts; in
particular, regarding the definition of term 'within the
scope of employment' as set forth in the Act[;]
"D. The matters submitted by Defendant RITA in its
Demand for Arbitration are not substantively arbitrable as
they are purely matters of state law subject to the right of
any future litigant to seek a construction of the statute by
the courts without prejudice as declared in paragraph C;
"E. Article 29.17 is valid only when read in conjunction
with language in the Governmental Tort Liability Act vesting
sole discretion in the Attorney General as to ...