Superior Court Providence County No. PC 08-7549 Richard A.
Licht Associate Justice
For
Plaintiff: Douglas A. Pettis, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal
For
Defendants: Matthew J. Libby, Esq. Jennifer J. Normand, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Paul
A. Suttell, Chief Justice
The
plaintiff, Moises Pineda (Pineda), appeals from a Superior
Court judgment granting the motion of the defendant, Chase
Bank USA, N.A. (Chase), for summary judgment with respect to
all claims asserted by Pineda against Chase. This matter came
before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in
this appeal should not be summarily decided. After
considering the parties' written and oral submissions and
after reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not
been shown and proceed to decide the appeal at this time. For
the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
I
Facts
and Procedural History
In
2008, Pineda attempted to refinance loans secured by
mortgages on two properties that he owned in Providence.
During the refinance proceedings, Pasquale Scavitti III
(Scavitti), an attorney, acted as the settlement
agent.[1] Scavitti and Pineda had been
acquaintances, and in 2006, Scavitti assisted Pineda with a
previous refinancing for those same two properties. It is
undisputed that in connection with Pineda's 2008
refinancing, Scavitti defalcated funds disbursed by Chase
that were intended to satisfy promissory notes secured by
mortgages on Pineda's two properties.
On
November 26, 2008, Pineda filed a complaint in Superior Court
naming both Chase and Scavitti as defendants.[2] Pineda claimed
that Chase agreed to issue him two new loans, each in the
amount of $195, 000, to pay promissory notes secured by
mortgages on the properties, [3] but that Scavitti, whom Chase
engaged as its closing agent, converted the loan proceeds for
his own use and failed to disburse them. Specifically, Pineda
alleged breach of fiduciary duty, civil liability for a crime
pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2, breach of contract,
conversion, and unjust enrichment. Subsequently, Chase moved
for summary judgment. Chase contended that it could not be
held liable for Scavitti's tortious conduct under a
theory of respondeat superior.
At the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Chase maintained
that summary judgment was proper because Scavitti was not
Chase's attorney during the closing and therefore was not
an agent of Chase. In the alternative, Chase contended that,
even if Scavitti was Chase's attorney, Scavitti's
defalcation of the loan funds was not within the scope of any
alleged agency relationship with Chase. Pineda, on the other
hand, argued that Chase was liable for Scavitti's actions
because Chase gave Scavitti the authority to receive and
disburse the loan funds, and Scavitti's malfeasance was
within that authority.
In his
bench decision, the hearing justice found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Scavitti was
acting as an agent of Chase at the time he absconded with the
loan funds. However, the hearing justice ultimately
determined that summary judgment was appropriate because,
even if Scavitti were an agent of Chase, there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Scavitti's conduct
was within the scope of the purported agency relationship
with Chase. Specifically, the hearing justice relied on the
Restatement (Second) Agency § 228(1)(c) at 504
(1958) for the proposition that a servant's conduct is
only considered within the scope of an agency relationship
for respondeat superior purposes if "it is actuated, at
least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." He
concluded that "there is no evidence, and none has been
submitted by [Pineda], that the conduct of Mr. Scavitti would
have been in any way, at least in part, for the purpose of
serving the master, even if Chase was the master."
Following
the entry of summary judgment in favor of Chase, Chase filed
a motion for the entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, to which Pineda
assented. Final ...