Providence
County Superior Court P2/14-3481A, William
E. Carnes, Jr. Associate Justice
For
State: Aaron L. Weisman: Department of Attorney General
For
Defendant: Richard S. Humphrey, Esq. Allyson M. Quay, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Gilbert V. Indeglia, Associate Justice
Today,
we are called upon to embark on the "journey we
reserve[d] for another day." State v. Pacheco,
161 A.3d 1166, 1177 (R.I. 2017). Less than a year ago in that
case, we "deem[ed] it unnecessary to decide whether
collateral estoppel is applicable to issues determined in the
[Rhode Island] Traffic Tribunal when all of the elements of
the doctrine are met." Id. With that issue once
again before us, we conclude that the time has come to decide
it.
Benjamin
D. Minior (Minior or defendant) was cited with the civil
violation of reasonable and prudent speeds[1] in the Rhode
Island Traffic Tribunal (Traffic Tribunal) and charged
criminally in Superior Court with the driving-related counts
of driving under the influence, serious bodily injury
resulting[2] and reckless driving.[3] Before a Superior
Court magistrate, defendant sought to dismiss his criminal
charges, arguing that the Traffic Tribunal magistrate
determined that he was not operating the vehicle and thus the
issue could not be relitigated based on collateral estoppel.
The Superior Court magistrate granted the motion to dismiss
and the state appealed. A Superior Court justice reversed the
dismissal. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice
erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on collateral
estoppel. The state counters that the present appeal from the
denial of a motion to dismiss is not properly before us.
For the
reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
I
Facts
and Travel
The
facts in this case are straightforward and largely
undisputed. On February 17, 2014 at 1:24 a.m., the Town of
Bristol (the town) police were dispatched to a motor vehicle
accident near 85 Broad Common Road. The vehicle-a 2004
Volvo-had veered off the road and severed a telephone pole,
then continued until it hit a tree approximately fifteen feet
away. A front-seat passenger suffered injuries to his head
and legs, while the suspected operator- identified by the
passenger as Minior-had a head laceration. Minior was
arrested and taken to Rhode Island Hospital on suspicion of
driving under the influence, where a blood test revealed a
blood-alcohol content of 0.153 mg/dl. That night, Bristol
police cited him with the civil violation of reasonable and
prudent speeds. He was also issued a summons to appear at an
arraignment for a driving under the influence, serious bodily
injury resulting charge, to which he entered no plea and was
released on bail.
The
defendant appeared before the Traffic Tribunal to answer his
civil violation on April 28, 2014. There, Bristol Officer
Kevin Kitchen, who was dispatched to the accident, testified
as to his observations at the scene. After Officer Kitchen
concluded his testimony, Bristol Officer Timothy Gallison,
who was also dispatched to the scene, testified as well.
Officer Gallison recalled that upon approaching the vehicle,
he witnessed a male sitting in the driver's seat.
After
both officers testified, defendant's attorney moved to
dismiss the violation. The defendant asserted that, based on
a lack of evidence as to both the posted speed limit and
defendant's operation of the vehicle, the town failed to
satisfy the requisite clear and convincing standard.
Significant to Minior's argument before us is the
magistrate's admonition to one of the officers that
"there was no testimony as to observation of the motor
vehicle at the time of the accident, as to who was driving
it. You're indicating and coming to the presumption as to
who was operating the vehicle." In conclusion, the
magistrate said "there was no observation of who was
operating the vehicle * * *, so the [c]ourt finds that the
[t]own has not sustained the violation for reasonable and
prudent speed[s]."
On
December 5, 2014, the state filed a criminal information
charging defendant with two driving-related counts: (1)
driving under the influence, serious bodily injury resulting;
and (2) reckless driving. On August 4, 2015, Minior moved
pursuant to Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure to dismiss the criminal charges, arguing that the
Traffic Tribunal's dismissal collaterally estopped the
criminal charges from proceeding. The motion to dismiss was
heard by a Superior Court magistrate on September 14, 2015.
The Superior Court magistrate granted the motion based
primarily on a decision he had rendered in a previous case.
Soon
after, the state appealed the Superior Court magistrate's
decision per G.L. 1956 § 8-2-11.1(d) and a Superior
Court justice heard the matter on December 15, 2015. The
justice reversed the Superior Court magistrate's
decision, emphasizing the distinction between "what the
Traffic Tribunal [magistrate] did and [what he] did not do
when he rendered his decision." Continuing, she noted
that "a careful review of the transcript" revealed
that the Traffic Tribunal magistrate did not make a specific
finding about whether defendant was operating the vehicle at
the time of the accident. Instead, the Traffic Tribunal
magistrate "merely found that the [t]own had not
sustained the violation, " and did not decide whether
defendant was operating the vehicle. "[The Traffic
Tribunal magistrate] merely commented on the absence of
evidence and found only that the [t]own had not sustained its
burden." The justice ...