Providence
County, PC 12-4093 Superior Court Bennett R. Gallo Associate
Justice
For
Plaintiff: Pamela M. Azar, Pro Se
For
Defendants: Kathleen A. Hilton, Esq. Marc Desisto, Esq.
Andrew Henneous, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
GILBERT V. INDEGLIA ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
Pamela
Azar (plaintiff or Azar), a former employee of the Town of
Lincoln School Department, appeals the Superior Court's
grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of
the defendants, Town of Lincoln, Lincoln School Committee,
and John Ward, in his official capacity as Finance Director
for the Town of Lincoln (collectively, Lincoln or defendants)
in an employment discrimination action. The plaintiff appears
before us pro se. This case came before the Supreme
Court on November 2, 2017, pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in
this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing
the parties' arguments and reviewing their memoranda, we
are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we
shall decide this appeal at this time without further
briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts
and Travel
On
August 8, 2012, Azar filed a complaint in Providence County
Superior Court alleging claims of employment discrimination
pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), G.L.
1956 chapter 112 of title 42, and the Civil Rights of People
with Disabilities Act (CRPDA), G.L. 1956 chapter 87 of title
42. She argued that she was discriminated against
because she advocated for education services for her disabled
son who was a student in the Lincoln school system.
Specifically, plaintiff contended that the Lincoln School
Department filed truancy charges with respect to her
son's absences as retaliation.[1]
At a
jury trial in June 2016, where she was represented by an
attorney, plaintiff testified to various actions taken by
teachers and the school principal, which amounted to what she
considered a hostile work environment. All the instances
about which plaintiff testified occurred after Lincoln filed
truancy charges in 2006 against her son and lasted until
plaintiff took a leave of absence in 2008. For example,
plaintiff described how other teachers treated her, including
ignoring her at meetings and excluding her from positions she
previously held. The plaintiff also said that the Special
Education Department often summoned her during her workday to
attend to issues regarding her son's education, and
plaintiff recalled being called to the main office over the
intercom, which was not a common practice. Azar, in reaction
to these occurrences, testified that she told the principal
that she was feeling "isolated by the teachers, "
but that he responded that he did not "want to get
involved."
The
plaintiff also testified regarding the 2009 truancy charges
Lincoln filed against her in response to her son's
failure to attend school for much of the 2008-2009 school
year. She stated that in the fall of 2008, she had started
exploring other placements for her son, and she disagreed
with Lincoln's choice of placement at the Bradley
School.[2] As a result, she appealed it to federal
court, and, in the interim, a hearing on the truancy charges
was conducted in October 2009. At the hearing, a Family Court
justice ordered that plaintiff's son be placed at the
Wolf School[3] for forty-five days. Azar testified that
the justice commented that he could not
"comprehend" why Lincoln took so long to file the
truancy charges. Over the next year, the parties returned to
the Family Court at least three times to reassess Azar's
son's educational placement. In October 2010, the charges
were dismissed. However, Azar testified that Lincoln wanted
to drop the charges earlier, but she requested that the
charges not be dropped because she wanted to "stay under
the protection of the Family Court" to ensure her
son's placement at the Wolf School.
In
addition to plaintiff's testimony, Mary Ann Canning
McComiskey, the teachers' union president and a school
social worker in Lincoln, testified for plaintiff at the
trial. She recalled that members of the school community were
well aware of Azar's "difficulties" with
Lincoln regarding her son. McComiskey, sensing the
less-than-harmonious relationships between Azar and other
teachers, spoke to teachers and the principal about the
matter. She stated that, during her conversation with the
principal, he was unable to justify why Azar had been called
to the office over the intercom. McComiskey recalled
explaining to the school superintendent in either 2005 or
2006 that Azar was being "socially isolated" and
that the superintendent responded that Azar was
"crazy."
The
defense called three witnesses to testify: Maryann Strubel,
the director of student services; and Barbara Marsden and
Kristen Lowe, two teachers who had worked with Azar. Marsden
and Lowe both testified that Azar had changed during the
2006-2007 school year, transforming every conversation into
one about her son, causing both teachers to try to change the
topic or avoid Azar altogether.
After
both sides rested, defendants moved for judgment as a matter
of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. The trial justice found that the statute of
limitations did not bar plaintiff's action with respect
to the 2009 truancy charges, but did bar her claims for the
2006 truancy charges.[4] As a result, the trial justice considered
whether plaintiff had satisfied her burden of proving that
defendants subjected her to a hostile work environment such
that a reasonable jury could find that defendants had
discriminated against her based on her advocacy for her son.
The trial justice concluded that plaintiff had not met that
burden. He also analyzed whether plaintiff had met her burden
under a retaliation claim analysis, ruling that the evidence
showed that Lincoln had legal justification to bring the
truancy charges based on her son's extended absence
during the 2008-2009 school year. He found that the 2009
truancy charges were not in retaliation for Azar's
advocacy for her son. The trial justice ultimately granted
defendants' motion.
On
appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial justice erred in
granting the motion for judgment as a matter of law because,
in her view, she presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find in her ...