United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
SCOTT A. WILSON, M.D.
UTC LABORATORIES, LLC, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LINCOLN D. ALMOND, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
before the Court is the Second Motion for Summary Judgment
filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 by Defendant UTC
Laboratories, LLC d/b/a Renaissance RX (“Renaissance
RX”). (ECF Doc. No. 60). Plaintiff Dr. Scott Wilson
filed an Objection. (ECF Doc. No. 65). This matter has been
referred to me for preliminary review, findings and
recommended disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); LR Cv
72(a). After reviewing the Memoranda submitted and relevant
case law, I recommend that Renaissance RX's Second Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF Doc. No. 60) be GRANTED.
Judge William E. Smith previously dismissed Syntactx LLC as a
Defendant in this case and narrowed the remaining claims to a
single Count (Count IV) against Renaissance RX. This Motion
focuses solely on whether there is a trialworthy issue
concerning Plaintiff's allegation that Renaissance RX
violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1(a)(2). Specifically,
Renaissance RX now sets forth a legal argument that Count IV
fails because Plaintiff has not presented the Court any
evidence of “injury.”
Report and Recommendation on the First Motion for Summary
Judgment, this Court noted that Renaissance RX based its
argument regarding Count IV “solely on its position
that Plaintiff agreed or consented to act as an RPI.”
(ECF Doc. No. 50 at p. 12). Because Renaissance RX did not
argue the damages issue, the Court considered only the
question of whether Dr. Wilson consented to serve as an RPI.
Finding an issue of fact that precluded entry of judgment, I
recommended denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Count IV and Renaissance RX objected. In its Objection before
Chief Judge Smith, Renaissance RX argued that Count IV should
be dismissed because Plaintiff had not presented evidence of
damages. Chief Judge Smith declined to consider their
argument because it was not presented to me in the first
instance. Following Chief Judge Smith's Memorandum and
Order, Renaissance RX moved for Leave to File this Second
Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted by Chief Judge
William E. Smith.
connection with this Motion, Renaissance RX submitted its
Statement of Undisputed Facts, as required by Local Rule. The
facts underlying the claims in this matter were fully set
forth in connection with the First Summary Judgment Motion.
Therefore, the facts submitted by Renaissance RX primarily
restate those that were presented in the First Motion for
Summary Judgment and rely on affidavits of Brandy Sheely and
Kenneth Ouriel, which were submitted to the Court previously.
(See ECF Doc. Nos. 22, 24). Rather than rehashing
the facts set forth in my previous Report and Recommendation
(ECF Doc. No. 50), the Court will narrow in on the facts with
respect to Plaintiff's allegations of injury concerning
Statement of Facts, Renaissance RX submits that
Plaintiff's Responses to Requests for Admission admit he
has not been sued as result of the conduct of Renaissance RX
(ECF Doc. No. 60-2 at ¶ 22), has not had a judgment
rendered against him due to Renaissance RX's conduct,
Id. ¶ 23, has not sustained damages as a result
of an individual reporting a HIPAA violation, Id.
¶ 25, and that his medical license is in good standing.
Id. ¶ 24.
Statement of Disputed facts, submitted as required by Local
Rule, relies extensively on his Second Declaration for the
proposition that the damages he sustained in connection with
the violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1(a)(2)
included the cost of retaining attorneys to assist him while
UTC/Syntactx were investigated by “investigators
working for the Department of Justice, ” and that he
was “not in a position to accept the compensation due
pursuant to the Trial and/or Investigator Agreements and
therefore lost said profits, ” and that he lost profits
when he decided to convey his interest in Partners in
Clinical Research. (ECF Doc. No. 66 at p. 3, citing
ECF Doc. No. 40 at ¶¶ 52-58).
shall be entitled to summary judgment “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving
party's favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957,
959 (1st Cir. 1997).
judgment involves shifting burdens between the moving and the
nonmoving parties. Initially, the burden requires the moving
party to aver “an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.” Garside v. Osco Drug,
Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986)). Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden
falls upon the nonmoving party, who must oppose the motion by
presenting facts that show a genuine “trialworthy issue
remains.” Cadle, 116 F.3d at 960 (citing
Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d
731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995); Maldonado-Denis v.
Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st
Cir. 1994)). An issue of fact is “genuine” if it
“may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Id. (citing Maldonado-Denis,
23 F.3d at 581).
oppose the motion successfully, the nonmoving party must
present affirmative evidence to rebut the motion. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-257
(1986). “Even in cases where elusive concepts such as
motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be
appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon
conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or]
unsupported speculation.” Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.
1990). Moreover, the “evidence illustrating the factual
controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must
have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions
of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.”
Id. (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989)).
Therefore, to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a ...