FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
PUERTO RICO [Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S.
S. McCutcheon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric
Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Vivianne M.
Marrero-Torres, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Supervisor, Appeals Section, on brief for appellee.
F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Senior
Appellate Counsel, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant
United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Rosa
Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney,
on brief for appellant.
Torruella, Lynch, Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Quiñones-Otero pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Quiñones-Otero
to twenty-seven months of incarceration, which was the top
end of the Guidelines range calculated by the presentence
investigation report. The sentence included three years of
supervised release with a six-month 6:00 PM curfew enforced
by electronic monitoring. Quiñones-Otero appeals from
the sentence arguing (1) the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed the curfew and electronic
monitoring requirement and (2) the twenty-seven-month
sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We
reject these arguments and affirm.
officers were on patrol around 6:00 AM, when a person brought
Quiñones-Otero to their attention. The person said
that Quiñones-Otero "was going to get
something." Quiñones-Otero had been in an
altercation at a bar earlier that night, had left the area,
and was now returning to a nearby Burger King, where his car
was parked. The police officers observed a weapon tucked into
Quiñones-Otero's waistband. Quiñones-Otero
ran when the police officers announced themselves and ordered
him to stop. Quiñones-Otero threw the weapon away
during the chase, and was ultimately apprehended. The police
officers found the weapon after arresting
Quiñones-Otero. During interrogation by agents from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
Quiñones-Otero admitted to having a prior conviction
for violating Puerto Rico copyright law. Further
investigation confirmed that Quiñones-Otero had a
prior conviction, for which he had served two years in
a former police officer, pled guilty without a plea agreement
to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The
Guidelines range, based on an offense level of fifteen and
Quiñones-Otero's criminal history category of II,
was twenty-one to twenty-seven months of imprisonment and
between one and three years of supervised
the hours of the six-month, 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM curfew,
Quiñones-Otero must "remain at [his] residence
except for employment or other activities approved in
advance" by United States Probation. The court ordered
he must also "wear an electronic device 24 hours a
day" and pay the costs of the device.
court justified the curfew and electronic monitoring
requirements by stating, "[t]he Court finds that the
conditions imposed are reasonably related to the offense of
conviction and to the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. [§] 3553" and "consistent with the
pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission." Quiñones-Otero objected to "the
procedural and substantive unreasonableness of the sentence
and to the imposition of the electronic monitoring period
following the service of the sentence."
six-month curfew stands. Quiñones-Otero did not object
to the curfew at sentencing, so his objection was not
preserved and plain error review applies. United States
v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
Quiñones-Otero's objection to the "electronic
monitoring period" only preserved his objection to the
electronic monitoring requirement, not the curfew. The
presentence investigation report suggested a six-month curfew
during non-working hours, but Quiñones-Otero did not
file an objection to the report.
was no plain error here. Conditions of release must be
"'reasonably related' to (1) the underlying
offense or character and criminal history of the defendant;
(2) the need to deter criminal conduct; (3) the goal of
protecting the public; or (4) the provision of rehabilitative
educational, health, or other treatment for the
defendant." United States v.
Rivera-López, 736 F.3d 633, 635 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)). Conditions of release
"must also 'involve no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary.'" Id.
(citation omitted) Although "the district court is
required to provide a reasoned and case-specific explanation
for the [special] conditions it imposes, " a district
court's failure to "explicitly provide such an
explanation" does not require us to "automatically
vacate the condition" as long as we can "infer the
court's reasoning from the record." United
States v. Fey, 834 F.3d 1, 3 ...