United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Chief Judge.
Before
the Court is Defendant Tyronne Seams's Motion to Vacate
or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (18
U.S.C. § 924(c)) (“Motion to
Vacate”).[1] For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion to Vacate is DENIED.
I.
Background
On
April 8, 2014, a grand jury indicted Defendant Seams. The
three-count Indictment charged Defendant and a co-defendant
with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; Hobbs Act
robbery; and the use and discharge of firearms in furtherance
of crimes of violence.[2] Defendant pleaded guilty to all three
counts on March 24, 2015.[3] On June 12, 2015, the Court sentenced
Defendant to 161 months: 41 months as to Counts I and II, to
run concurrently with each other; and 120 months as to Count
III, to run consecutive to Counts I and II.[4] The Court
sentenced Defendant to the 120-month consecutive term based
on his guilty plea to Count III of the Indictment for using,
carrying, brandishing, and discharging two firearms in
connection with a crime of violence (namely, Hobbs Act
robbery and/or conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery).[5]
On June
24, 2016, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Vacate,
arguing that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135
S.Ct. 2551 (2015), he was unlawfully sentenced under the
residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which is
substantially similar to the Armed Career Criminal Act's
(“ACCA”) residual clause.[6] ACCA's residual clause
was struck down as unconstitutionally vague in Johnson
II. In Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257,
1268 (2016), the Supreme Court held that Johnson II
announced a substantive rule and therefore had retroactive
effect.
II.
Analysis
A. 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) and Hobbs Act Robbery
The
relevant part of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides that:
any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in
a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or
who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime
of violence . . . [be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment].[7]
Under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), “crime of violence”
is defined as:
[A]n offense that is a felony and-
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the
offense.[8]
The
Court refers to § 924(c)(3)(A) as the “force
clause” and § 924(c)(3)(B) as the “residual
clause.”[9]
The
“crime of violence” for which Defendant was
indicted and convicted is Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951. Section 1951(a) penalizes any person
who “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce . . . by robbery or extortion or attempts or
conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence
to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose
to do anything in violation of this
section.”[10] Section 1951(b) defines robbery, in
pertinent part, as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property from the person or in the presence of
another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened
force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future,
to his person or property.”[11]
Defendant
contends that the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson
II, that ACCA's residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague, should be extended to §
924(c)(3)'s residual clause because they are
“substantially similar.”[12] Defendant further argues
that, in the absence of § 924(c)(3)'s residual
clause, Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery do not qualify as crimes of violence under §
924(c)(3)'s force clause.[13] The Government, in rejoinder,
argues that (1) Hobbs Act robbery squarely rests within the
force clause of 924(c); (2) even if Hobbs ...