United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Judge.
Perry has petitioned this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment of
conviction, entered after a jury found him guilty of
racketeering and related offenses from over 20 years ago. He
claims that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence of witness collusion and government
misconduct. Mr. Perry has also filed a motion to amend his
§ 2255 motion. The Court finds that Mr. Perry's
Motion to Vacate is untimely and thus DENIES and DISMISSES
his petition. The Motion to Amend is DENIED.
a two-year investigation, on September 21, 1995, a federal
grand jury sitting in the District of Rhode Island indicted
Mr. Perry and others on charges of violations of the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), conspiracy to commit racketeering, two
counts of violent crime (murder) in aid of racketeering, two
counts of conspiracy to commit murder, carjacking, and two
counts of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence, based on their involvement in the Providence
chapter of the Almighty Latin King Nation. A Superseding
April 10, 1997, after a lengthy jury trial, Mr. Perry was
convicted on all but one count with which he was charged. He
was sentenced on September 23, 1997, to, among other
penalties, three concurrent and two additional consecutive
terms of life imprisonment. Judgment entered on October 2,
Perry appealed his convictions, and, in an opinion issued on
June 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments.
United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir.
1999). The United States Supreme Court denied further review
on January 18, 2000. Perry v. United States, 528
U.S. 1127 (2000) (mem.).
2255 provides for post-conviction relief only if the court
sentenced a petitioner in violation of the Constitution or
lacked jurisdiction to impose his sentence, if the sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum, or if the sentence is
otherwise subject to collateral attack. David v. United
States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998). In attempting
to collaterally attack his sentence, the petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating "exceptional circumstances"
that warrant redress under § 2255. See Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Mack v.
United States, 635 F.2d 20, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1980). For
example, an error of law must constitute a "fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice." Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; accord
David, 134 F.3d at 474.
2255 provides that:
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion
under this section. The limitation period shall run from the
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the