United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and WESTERN RESERVE LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF OHIO, Plaintiffs,
JOSEPH CARAMADRE; RAYMOUR RADHAKRISHNAN; ESTATE PLANNING RESOURCES, INC.; ADM ASSOCIATES, LLC; HARRISON CONDIT; EDWARD MAGGIACOMO, JR.; and FORTUNE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
William E. Smith Chief Judge
Caramadre's stranger-initiated annuity transaction
(“STAT”) schemes have been described at length
not only by this Court, but also by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals and the Rhode Island Supreme Court. This Memorandum
and Order assumes that the reader is familiar with
Caramadre's STAT scheme, as well as the criminal charges
and civil litigation it has generated.
originally brought seven separate civil cases which have been
consolidated into one action, with Plaintiffs'
Consolidated Complaint (ECF No. 186) as the operative
complaint. Defendants Caramadre and ADM Associates, LLC
(“ADM”) responded with answers and counterclaims.
There are currently three motions pending before the Court:
(1) Defendants Caramadre and ADM's Motion to Reconsider
the Court's July 12, 2016 Order regarding their untimely
response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 227); (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 212); and (3)
Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Attachment of
Defendant Joseph Caramadre's Membership Interest in ADM
and for Preliminary Injunction Preventing Caramadre from
Transferring Assets of ADM or his Interest Therein (ECF No.
187). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to
Reconsider is DENIED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Motion for
Prejudgment Attachment and a Preliminary Injunction is held
pending additional briefing.
Motion to Reconsider
12, 2016, this Court entered an Order (ECF No. 226) denying
Defendants Caramadre and ADM's Motion requesting leave to
file a memorandum of law in support of its opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The
Order noted that the Court would disregard the memorandum
that had been untimely filed by ADM. The Court also entered a
text order on July 12 granting Plaintiffs' Motion to
Strike Caramadre's memorandum in support of his
opposition for the reasons set forth in the Order. Defendants
Caramadre and ADM subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider
this Order,  in which Caramadre states that he does not
disagree with the Court's decision to disregard the
memoranda that were not timely filed, and acknowledges that
the Court was “on proper legal grounds to disregard the
late motions.” (Mot. to Recons. 1, 2, ECF No. 227.)
Caramadre then requests that the Court consider punishing
ADM's attorney for his failure to timely file the
response in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion because, he
contends, the attorney misled him to believe that the
responsive documents would be filed by the June 15, 2016
final deadline set by the Court in a Text Order entered on
June 8, 2016. (Id. at 3-5.)
has not provided any basis on which the Court could or would
reconsider its July 12 Order and decision to disregard the
responsive memoranda filed by both Caramadre and ADM. The
Court was well within its discretion to enforce the final
deadline that it set after it had granted several extensions,
and the Court's reasoning for enforcing the final
deadline is articulated in detail in its Order. (See
ECF No. 226.) The Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on three of
the seventeen counts in the Consolidated Complaint, as well
as on all five of Caramadre's counterclaims and all four
of ADM's counterclaims. (Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 1, ECF
No. 212.) Summary judgment may enter on any claim for which
the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact
“exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d
16, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The Court must consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party's favor.
Dávila v. Corporación de Puerto Rico Para
La Difusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9, 12 (1st
motion is unopposed because Defendants Caramadre and ADM
failed to timely file a response. (See July 12, 2016
Order, ECF No. 226.) Pursuant to the local rules of civil
procedure for the District of Rhode Island, Plaintiffs'
Statement of Undisputed Facts shall be deemed admitted
because Defendants did not file a Statement of Disputed
Facts. LR Cv 56(a)(3). Federal Rule 56 is clear, however,
that this Court must still analyze Plaintiffs' motion to
determine whether they are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3);
Sanchez-Figueroa v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico,
527 F.3d 209, 212 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that an unopposed
motion for summary judgment “does not automatically
give rise to a grant of summary judgment” because
“the district court still must consider the
plaintiff[s'] [claims] based on the record properly
before [it] . . . .”) (quoting Aguiar-Carrasquillo
v. Agosto-Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006))).
1. Plaintiffs' Claim for Civil Liability pursuant to R.I.
Gen. Laws § 9-1-2 as to Defendants Caramadre and
argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on their
claims in Count V that Caramadre and Radhakrishnan are
civilly liable for their criminal conduct because Caramadre
and Radhakrishnan have admitted to committing mail fraud,
wire fraud, and identity fraud, obtaining signatures by false
pretenses and forgery, and conspiring to defraud and obtain
significant sums of money from insurance companies in
violation of state law. (Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for
Partial Summ. J. (“Pls.' Mem.”) 8-10, ECF No.
212.) Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts
(“SUF”), deemed admitted by Defendants'
failure to timely file a statement of disputed facts, states
that they were two of several insurance companies to whom
Defendants submitted annuity applications using
terminally-ill individuals as annuitants. (SUF ¶ 7, ECF
No. 213.) Plaintiff's SUF incorporates the Statement of
Facts that Defendants admitted as part of their respective
plea agreements. (SUF ¶ 2; SUF Ex. B, ECF No. 213.) In
the Statement of Facts, Defendants in fact admitted to
“knowingly and willfully conspir[ing] with each other
and with others to commit” mail fraud, wire fraud, and
identity fraud, in violation of federal law. (SUF Ex. B 1.)
Defendants also admitted that they “fraudulently
obtained millions of dollars by making . . . material
misrepresentations and omissions to  terminally-ill people
. . . in order to obtain identity information and signatures
for use in furtherance of the scheme . . . .”
(Id. at 3.) It is also undisputed that (1)
Plaintiffs were acknowledged as victims of Defendants'
scheme; (2) Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio
(“WRL”) is entitled to $1, 102, 464.28 in
restitution; and (3) Transamerica Life Insurance Company is
entitled to $805, 926.18 in restitution. (SUF ¶ 15; SUF
Ex. D 11.)
Island General Laws § 9-1-2 provides, in relevant part,
that “[w]henever any person shall suffer any injury to
his or her person, reputation, or estate by reason of the
commission of any crime or offense, he or she may recover his
or her damages for the injury in a civil action against the
offender . . . .” The statute clearly enables
Plaintiffs to recover the monetary damages incurred as a
result of Caramadre and Radhakrishnan's conduct. This
Court concludes that Caramadre and Radhakrishnan are civilly
liable to Plaintiffs for the criminal conduct to which they
admitted as part of the plea agreement. However, this claim
represents only a portion of Count V, which broadly claims
civil liability for several state and federal crimes and
offenses allegedly perpetrated by five of the seven
defendants. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled only to
judgment as a matter of law with respect to the civil
liability of Caramadre and Radhakrishnan.
Plaintiffs' Claim for Violations of RICO as to
Defendants Caramadre and Radhakrishnan
argue that Defendants are liable for their individual
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) and (d) and are therefore entitled to treble
damages, costs of the lawsuit, and attorneys' fees
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Count
(Pls.' Mem. 10.) Four elements are required to prove a
RICO claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c): “(1)
conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of
racketeering activity.” Giuliano v. Fulton,
399 F.3d 381, 386 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Kenda Corp. v.
Pot O'Gold Money Leagues, Inc., 329 F.3d
216, 233 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
activity' means any act that violates one of the federal
laws specified in the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1), including the mail and wire fraud statutes,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.” Id. A
“pattern” is established by “[a]t least two
acts of racketeering activity [occurring] within ten years of
each other.” Id. (citing § 1961(5)).
“The Supreme Court has construed the pattern element as
additionally requiring a showing that ‘the racketeering
predicates are related, and that they amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity.'”
Id. (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). An
“enterprise” is defined as “includ[ing] any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4).
claims under § 1962(d), a plaintiff must show that each
defendant in the RICO conspiracy case joined knowingly in the
scheme and was involved himself, directly or indirectly, in
the commission of at least two predicate acts.”
Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 441 (1st Cir. 1995)
(quoting Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942
F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1991)).
there is no dispute that Defendants engaged in conduct that
falls within the definition of “racketeering
activity” because they pled guilty to one count of wire
fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, mail
fraud, and identity theft, United States v.
Caramadre, 807 F.3d 359, 365 (1st Cir. 2015), and
admitted to a statement of facts that included wire and mail
fraud activity (SUF ¶ 2, Ex. B). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1). There is also no dispute that Caramadre and
Radhakrishnan engaged in a pattern of this racketeering
activity because Radhakrishnan joined Caramadre's
existing scheme in 2007 and admitted to engaging in
racketeering conduct through 2010 (SUF ¶ 6).