United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, CHIEF JUDGE.
In this
case the Plaintiff, David Deighan, claims that his employer,
SuperMedia, and his supervisor, Todd Sanislow, discriminated
against him because of his disability. His claims fall into
two categories, the first dealing with his request for leave
and the second with the ultimate termination of his
employment. Discovery is complete. Defendants SuperMedia and
Sanislow now move for summary judgment claiming that there
are no disputed issues of material fact that require a trial
and that Deighan's claims fail as a matter of
law.[1]
For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED. As Defendants' and Plaintiff's
other motions need not be decided in order to rule on the
summary judgment issue, those motions are moot.
I.
Background
The
factual backdrop to the Defendants' motion is fairly
straightforward and the essential facts are undisputed. In
2012, Plaintiff David Deighan was a sales manager at
Defendant SuperMedia working under the supervision of
Defendant Todd Sanislow. In May of 2012, Deighan suffered
from “acute anxiety disorder” and commenced
medical leave from his position at SuperMedia. SuperMedia
agreed to allow Deighan to take approved leave under the FMLA
(for 12 weeks) and RIPFMLA (for 13 weeks), which ran
concurrently. On August 13, 2012, near the conclusion of
Deighan's statutory leave, Deighan notified SuperMedia
that “[d]ue to my disability and recommendation from my
doctors, I am not able to hold a sales or sales management
position. Additionally, it is required that I not drive long
distances. My current commute is 150 miles . . . .”
(Defs.' Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 25-3.) Deighan went on to
request that SuperMedia give him a new position that was (1)
“in the customer service and sales support
arenas”; (2) “at an equivalent title and income I
currently hold”; and (3) located at SuperMedia's
facility in Middleton, Massachusetts (which was located close
to Deighan's house). (Id.)
The
next day, Deighan submitted a “Job Accommodation
Request” form to SuperMedia. (Id.) In that
form, Deighan stated that his previous email
“summarize[d] [his] requests” and attached a copy
of that letter. (Id.) Additionally, Deighan stated
that, “[p]er medical advice, the nature of the direct
sales or sales management role caused and would exacerbate
[his] medical condition.” (Id.) Given his
inability to work in his prior sales management role, Deighan
requested a “permanent accommodation.”
(Id.)
SuperMedia
agreed to extend Deighan's short-term disability leave
from August through November 16, 2012 and began looking for
another position that Deighan could fill outside of sales
management. In September, SuperMedia notified Deighan that
there were no other openings with the same title and income
as Deighan's previous sales management position.
(Defs.' Mot. Ex. C, ECF No. 25-3.) In response, despite
the fact that Deighan had previously told SuperMedia that he
was medically unable to perform the job, Deighan requested
that he be able to return to the sales management position at
the conclusion of his short-term disability leave on November
16, 2012. (Defs.' Mot. Ex. E, ECF No. 25-3.)
SuperMedia
agreed to allow Deighan to return to that position under two
conditions. (Id.) First, SuperMedia notified Deighan
that there was a “business need” to permanently
fill the sales manager position, such that, if Deighan did
not return on November 16, SuperMedia would backfill the
position with someone else. (Defs.' Mot. Exs. D and F,
ECF No. 25-3.) Second, because Deighan had repeatedly stated
that he was medically unable to work as a sales manager,
SuperMedia told Deighan that he would have to provide a
“doctor's note” stating that he could safely
return to work. (Defs.' Mot. Ex. E, ECF No. 25-3.)
Deighan responded by reaffirming his intent to return to work
on November 16 and agreed to provide some sort of
doctor's note clearing him to work. (Id.)
Then,
on November 14, Deighan sent the following email to Sanislow
and SuperMedia's human resources department:
Due to my current medical condition, my doctors will not
approve a RTW [return to work] date of November 16, 2012.
With continued treatment, they are hopeful for a RTW date of
early Jan[uary] 2013. Thank you for your continued
flexibility.
(Pl.'s Resp. Ex. B, ECF No. 27-2.) SuperMedia responded
as follows:
Thank you for your accommodation request. Unfortunately, we
are unable to accommodate you with additional time off. We
look forward to seeing you on November 16, 2012 . . . . If
you are unable to return to work on November 16, 2012, either
with or without an accommodation, SuperMedia may fill or
eliminate your position due to business needs. If your
position is backfilled or eliminated and you are later
released to return to work, you are encouraged to reapply for
available job openings. . . .
(Id.)
Deighan
initially responded to SuperMedia's email by sending a
farewell note to his former colleagues. (Defs.' Mot. Ex.
G, ECF No. 25-3.) However, sometime thereafter, Deighan
resumed contact with SuperMedia in order to request that he
be able to return to work in January of 2013. (Defs.'
Mot. Ex. I, ECF No. 25-3.) SuperMedia declined to keep the
position open through January and backfilled the position
with another employee. (Id.) SuperMedia contends
that these actions were taken because there was a business
need to permanently fill the sales management position after
over six months (May through November of 2012) of that
position being filled on a temporary basis. (See
Sanislow Decl., ECF No. 25-4.)
Deighan
subsequently filed the instant suit against both SuperMedia
and his supervisor, Todd Sanislow. Deighan's Complaint
alleges disability-based discrimination under the Rhode
Island Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act
(“CRPD”), the Rhode Island Fair Employment
Practices Act (“FEPA”), and the Rhode Island
Civil Rights Act of 1990 (“RICRA”). Additionally,
Deighan's Complaint alleges unlawful disability-based
retaliation and interference under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Rhode Island Parental
and Family Medical Leave Act (“RIPFMLA”).
II.
Discussion
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary
judgment is appropriate where the Court finds, “after
studying the parties' evidentiary proffers and giving the
benefit of reasonable doubt to those against whom the motion
is directed, that there is no genuine issue of material fact
in dispute and that the motion's proponent is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Stella v. Town of
Tewksbury, Mass., 4 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). There can be no genuine issue of material
fact where a party “fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Put another way,
the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Oliver
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir.
1988) (internal quotations omitted).
In
determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material
fact, this Court must review the facts “in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and must
indulge all inferences favorable to that party . . . .”
Id. However, “[t]he party opposing the motion
. . . may not rest upon mere allegations.” Id.
Instead, the opposing party must supply specific facts,
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Furthermore, all affidavits and
declarations “must be made on personal knowledge, set
out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that
the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the
matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
B. FMLA
and RIPFMLA Claims
Deighan
alleges that SuperMedia and Sanislow violated both the FMLA
and the RIPFMLA. The FMLA entitles an “eligible
employee” to 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month
period for a “serious health condition” and, on
return from such leave, to be restored to the same or
equivalent position. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(D),
2614(a)(1)(A)-(B). The RIPFMLA provides substantially the
same statutory protections as the FMLA, but instead of 12
weeks of leave for an employee's “serious health
condition, ” it provides for 13 weeks of leave for
“parental and family leave.” R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 28-48-2. Courts have used the same analysis when
reviewing claims under both the FMLA and RIPFMLA. See,
e.g., Kenney v. Bethany Home of Rhode Island, No.
09-CV-289-ML, 2011 WL 1770537, at *2 n.3 (D.R.I. May 9, 2011)
(“[T]he analysis of the elements of the RIPFMLA and the
FMLA claims is the same, and, to the extent the state statute
is not preempted, the Court's review of the federal
claims addresses the state statute as well.”);
Tardie v. Rehab. Hosp. of Rhode Island, 6 F.Supp.2d
125, 134 (D.R.I. 1998), aff'd, 168 F.3d 538 (1st Cir.
1999). This Court therefore analyzes Deighan's FMLA and
RIPFMLA claims together.
Causes
of action under both the FMLA and RIPFMLA are divided into
“two distinct groups: interference claims and
retaliation claims.” Kenney, 2011 WL 1770537,
at *2 (citing Hodgens v. General Dynmaics Corp., 144
F.3d 151, 159-60 ...