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Thomas v. Colvin

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

October 31, 2016

DIANA THOMAS
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          LINCOLN D. ALMOND United States Magistrate Judge

         This matter is before the Court for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Social Security Insurance (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 11, 2015 seeking to reverse the decision of the Commissioner. On May 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner. (Document No. 10). On July 29, 2016, the Commissioner filed a Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner. (Document No. 12). Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum on October 16, 2016. (Document No. 15).

         This matter has been referred to me for preliminary review, findings and recommended disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); LR Cv 72. Based upon my review of the record, the parties' submissions and independent research, I find that there is substantial evidence in this record to support the Commissioner's decision and findings that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, I recommend that Plaintiff's Motion (Document No. 10) be DENIED and that the Commissioner's Motion (Document No. 12) be GRANTED.

         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff filed applications for DIB on October 23, 2014 (Tr. 176-182) and for SSI on July 11, 2014 (Tr. 167-175) alleging disability since June 6, 2014. The applications were denied initially on October 22, 2014 (Tr. 69-74) and on reconsideration on January 14, 2015. (Tr. 85-91). Plaintiff's date last insured is December 31, 2018. (Tr. 15). Plaintiff requested an Administrative Hearing. On July 8, 2015, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Jason Mastrangelo (the “ALJ”) at which time Plaintiff, represented by counsel, a vocational expert (“VE”) and a medical expert (“ME”) appeared and testified. (Tr. 35-68). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff on July 27, 2015. (Tr. 11-29). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on November 2, 2015. (Tr. 1-3). Therefore the ALJ's decision became final. A timely appeal was then filed with this Court.

         II. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

         Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinions of Plaintiff's treating therapist, and had no medical support for his mental RFC findings.

         The Commissioner disputes Plaintiff's claims and contends that substantial evidence supports both the limited weight accorded to the treating therapist's opinions and the ALJ's RFC finding.

         III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

         The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla - i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981).

         Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact. Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Frustaglia v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 829 F.2d 192, 195 (1st Cir. 1987); Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir. 1986) (court also must consider evidence detracting from evidence on which Commissioner relied).

         The court must reverse the ALJ's decision on plenary review, however, if the ALJ applies incorrect law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that he or she properly applied the law. Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam); accord Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). Remand is unnecessary where all of the essential evidence was before the Appeals Council when it denied review, and the evidence establishes without any doubt that the claimant was disabled. Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2001) citing, Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985).

         The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); or under both sentences. Seavey, 276 F.3d at 8. To remand under sentence four, the court must either find that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. Id.; accord Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (remand appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm, but also was insufficient for district court to find claimant disabled).

         Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a sentence-four remand may be appropriate to allow her to explain the basis for her decision. Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 609-610 (1st Cir. 2001). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (necessary for ALJ on remand to consider psychiatric report tendered to Appeals Council). After a sentence four remand, the court enters a final and appealable judgment immediately, and thus loses jurisdiction. Freeman, 274 F.3d at 610.

         In contrast, sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides:

The court...may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding;

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To remand under sentence six, the claimant must establish: (1) that there is new, non-cumulative evidence; (2) that the evidence is material, relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there is good cause for failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level. See Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-1092 (11th Cir. 1996).

         A sentence six remand may be warranted, even in the absence of an error by the Commissioner, if new, material evidence becomes available to the claimant. Id. With a sentence six remand, the parties must return to the court after remand to file modified findings of fact. Id. The court retains jurisdiction pending remand, and does not enter a final judgment until after the completion of remand proceedings. Id.

         IV. ...


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