United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, CHIEF JUDGE.
Plaintiff,
Janice Gulluscio, filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) against
Defendants Stryker Sales Corporation, Stryker Sustainability
Solutions, Inc., and Stryker Orthopedics Corp.,
(collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that
Defendants negligently designed, manufactured, and sold the
Trident Acetabular System (“Trident System”);
Defendants negligently failed to warn consumers of the
Trident System's defect; and Defendants breached their
express and implied warranties that the Trident System was
safe for its intended use. Plaintiff moves to amend her
Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(B)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Pl.'s Mot. to
Amend Compl., ECF No. 7.) Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss
Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 6.) For the following reasons,
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is GRANTED, and
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I.
Facts[1]
On or
about September 23, 2003, Plaintiff underwent a complete hip
replacement surgery for her right hip at the Westerly
Hospital. Her hip was replaced with the Trident System, which
was allegedly designed, manufactured, and sold by one or more
of the Defendants. In February 2013, Plaintiff's hip
replacement system allegedly failed, causing her to fall and
suffer several serious injuries, including a broken wrist, a
broken tooth, a spinal fracture, and various bruises and
contusions. Plaintiff subsequently underwent another hip
replacement surgery and incurred the pain and suffering
attendant with such a procedure.
Plaintiff
filed this suit in the Superior Court of the State of Rhode
Island, County of Washington, on January 27, 2016 and
Defendants timely removed the action on June 22, 2016.
II.
Discussion
A.
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
Plaintiff
has moved to amend her Complaint as a matter of course
pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint twenty-one days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B); see
also Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st
Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is clear beyond hope of contradiction
that the Civil Rules permit a party to amend its complaint
‘once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served.'”). The Court
therefore grants Plaintiff's Motion and considers the
facts alleged in the Amended Complaint in determining the
merits of Defendants' Motion.
B.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept
the well-pleaded facts as true, viewing factual allegations
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 35
(1st Cir. 2009). However, “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations
omitted).
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff's Complaint is legally insufficient
because it fails to state facts that support all of the
elements of Plaintiff's claims. Reading the Complaint in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court disagrees
and finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
state a plausible claim for relief for each of her claims.
With
respect to Plaintiff's claim for negligent design,
manufacture, and sale of the Trident System, Defendants argue
that “[n]owhere does the Complaint offer any facts
specifying any way in which [Defendants] breached a duty owed
to Plaintiff, nor does the Complaint even plead that such a
duty existed.” (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot.
to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 6.) While the
Complaint does not explicitly state that Defendants owed
Plaintiff a duty of care, the Complaint nonetheless
adequately establishes the elements of her negligence claim.
The Complaint states that Defendants were manufacturers,
designers, and sellers of the Trident System, and implied
that Plaintiff was the ultimate consumer of the Trident
System. (Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 9.) The Complaint further
alleges that Defendants knew or should have known of the
Trident System's defective condition and that the defect
caused Plaintiff's injuries. (Id. at 2.) These
facts adequately allege that Defendants, as manufacturers,
had a duty to provide consumers, such as Plaintiff, with
products that were safe for their intended uses. See
Crawford v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co. Inc., 14
F.Supp.2d 202, 210 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding that, under Rhode
Island law, “[t]he legal duty that is the predicate for
the . . . negligent manufacturing claim is the general duty
of every manufacturer to use due care to avoid foreseeable
dangers in its products”) (quoting Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996)); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395. The facts alleged
in the Complaint clearly imply that Defendants owed Plaintiff
a duty of care in manufacturing the Trident System and,
therefore, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
With
respect to Plaintiff's claim for negligent failure to
warn of the Trident System's defective condition,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to “demonstrate
that defendant had reason to know about the product's
dangerous propensities which caused plaintiff's
injury.” (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to
Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. as a Matter of Course 6, ECF
No. 12.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff states that “the
[Trident] System was designed and manufactured so as to be
insufficient to withstand the foreseeable use and placement
in the human body” and that Defendants “continued
to sell and distribute the System even though they knew of
its unsafe nature.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 10, ECF
No. 9.) Based on these facts, Plaintiff then alleges that
Defendants “failed to properly warn consumers of the
dangers of the System.” (Id. at ¶ 11.)
Contrary to Defendants' argument, this last statement is
not merely a legal conclusion. It is a factual statement
alleging Defendants' failure to take a particular action.
Thus, taken as a whole, the Complaint states sufficient facts
to support Plaintiff's claim that Defendants knew of the
defect and negligently failed to warn Plaintiff of that
defect. See Crawford, 14 F.Supp.2d at 210 (holding
that “the predicate for the failure to warn claim is
the general duty to inform users . . . of potentially
dangerous items of the risks involved in their use”
(quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 501)).
Lastly,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for breach of
express and implied warranty fail to meet the
Twombly pleading standard because they state only
“bald, conclusory allegations.” (Defs.' Mem.
of Law in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. as a
Matter of Course 4, ECF No. 12.) In light of the facts
Plaintiff has alleged, the breach of warranty claims seem to
be based on a theory of strict products liability. Under
Rhode Island law, a cause of action for damages caused by a
defective product “may be predicated upon either a
theory of breach of warranty or one of strict liability in
tort. . . the two theories, basically, are merely different
ways of describing the very same cause of action.”
Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d 555,
561-62 (R.I. 1975) (Joslin, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (quotations omitted); see also Dooley
v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 817 F.Supp. 245, 247-48
(D.R.I. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 218 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding
that “[r]esponsibility for personal injury caused by a
defective product . . . may be imposed on one who
‘sells' the product on the theory of strict
liability in tort as set forth in Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A”) (citations omitted). ...