WILLIAM C. MCLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff,
v.
ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW for the TOWN OF TIVERTON, DAVID COLLINS, SUSAN KRUMHOLTZ, LISE J. GESCHEIDT, Chairperson, JOHN R. JACKSON, Vice-Chairperson, RICHARD D. TAYLOR, in their capacities as members of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Tiverton, Defendants.
Newport
County Superior Court
For
Plaintiff: Daniel Calabro, Jr., Esq.; Thomas Connolly, Esq.
For
Defendant: Peter Frederick Skwirz, Esq.; Gina A. DiCenso,
Esq.
DECISION
STONE,
J.
This
matter came before the Court on May 25, 2016, when Plaintiff
William C. McLaughlin (McLaughlin or Plaintiff) filed a
Motion to Vacate this Court's April 7, 2014 Order
requiring him to remove a garage from his property, and all
subsequent orders derived therefrom, pursuant to Super. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiff argues that the Court was without
jurisdiction and, therefore, the judgment was void. For the
reasoning set forth herein, the Plaintiff's Motion is
denied.
I
Facts
and Travel
McLaughlin
owned property located at 1640 Fish Road in Tiverton, Rhode
Island (the Property). In 2007, he applied for a building
permit to build a forty foot by sixty foot garage on the
Property. Subsequently, a permit was issued and the garage
was constructed. However- responding to complaints from
neighbors-in 2009, the Tiverton Building Official inspected
the Property and found that the placement of the garage was
in violation of both the front and side yard setback
requirements of the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance. See
Tiverton Zoning Ordinance, art. V, § 1; art. VI,
§§ 1, 3.
Thereafter,
in 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for a variance from
the Tiverton Zoning Board of Review, listing himself as the
applicant and owner of the offending structure. Following
some continuances, a hearing on the application took place on
September 7, 2011, and the application was denied the
following month. Then, on October 26, 2011, Plaintiff
appealed the Tiverton Zoning Board of Review's decision
to this Court, and roughly two years later, judgment was
entered in favor of the Town.[1] McLaughlin filed a notice of
appeal that was denied and dismissed by the Supreme Court on
January 14, 2014.
On
March 11, 2014, the Town filed a motion with the Court
requesting that Plaintiff remove the garage within ninety
days-having lost his application for relief from the Zoning
Ordinance. That motion was granted on April 7, 2014 by Order
of this Court. Defendant never appeared at the hearing on the
motion, nor did he file an objection. Nonetheless, McLaughlin
filed a motion to reconsider the Court's April 7 2014
Order, which was heard by the Court and denied in part on May
9, 2014. When the Court asked McLaughlin what he was seeking,
he responded that "I'd be happy if you just started
the clock over [on the enforcement and imposition of the
fine], ninety days [from] today." Indeed, the Court did
modify its April 7, 2014 order to the extent that it allowed
McLaughlin ninety days to remove the garage, effective May 9,
2014, and the imposition of a two hundred dollar a day fine
for each day the garage remained in place beyond the ninety
day period. Thereafter, on July 22, 2014, McLaughlin filed
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court which
was denied on June 12, 2015.
On
November 14, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to hold
Plaintiff in contempt of the Court's earlier order for
noncompliance. After a continuance, the Town's motion was
granted, and, on August 5, 2015, the Court entered an Order
fining McLaughlin $69, 300 for failure to comply with the
Court's earlier Order. On October 16, 2015, Defendants
filed a motion with the Court seeking permission to remove
the garage as McLaughlin had still failed to do so. On
November 18, 2015, this Court entered an Order giving
McLaughlin ninety days to remove the structure on his own;
following that time, the Town could remove the structure
without any further order of the Court. Following the
expiration of those final ninety days, the Town did indeed
elect to have the structure removed on March 28, 2016.
On May
26, 2016, McLaughlin filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to
Rule 60(b). In essence, McLaughlin argued that this Court
never had subject matter jurisdiction to order injunctive
relief against him and, as such, the Court must now vacate
the previous judgment. The Town objected arguing that the
Plaintiff's instant motion is either: 1) barred by
res judicata; 2) untimely; or 3) simply without
merit. The Court heard argument from both parties on June 6,
2016, and indicated that it would issue a written decision on
the matter. Decision is herein rendered in favor of the Town
for the reasoning set forth in further detail below.
II
Standard
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