PETITION
FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Claudia Gregoire and Mills & Born LLP, on brief for
petitioner.
David
Schor, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Benjamin C.
Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, and Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director, on
brief for respondent.
Before
Torruella, Kayatta, and Barron, Circuit Judges.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
Jorge
Mario Marín-Portillo ("Marín")
petitions this court for review of an order from the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the
Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of his
request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT").
Finding Marín's arguments unpersuasive, we deny
his petition.
I.
We
recount the facts as presented in the record, noting that the
IJ assumed that Marín was credible. Marín was
born and raised in Guatemala. In November 2006, when
Marín was seventeen years old, a police officer named
Edgar Leonel Cuellar shot and killed Marín's
father after Marín's father declined to lend him
money. Cuellar believed Marín's father was wealthy
and had previously borrowed money from him.
Cuellar
was convicted of robbery and battery, but not murder, and
incarcerated for three years.[1] While Cuellar was incarcerated,
Marín's mother received five to six phone calls
telling her that, upon his release, Cuellar would kill her as
well as Marín, Marín's brother, and
Marín's uncle as retaliation for pressing charges
against him. In addition, Cuellar had family members of
another person in jail tell Marín and members of his
family in person that Cuellar would kill them.
Based
on these threats, Marín left Guatemala in February
2011 and entered the United States that March without
inspection. After Marín left, Cuellar was released.
Marín's family, including his mother, uncle, two
sisters, and two brothers, remain in Guatemala and have not
been harmed.[2]
In May
2011, the Government initiated removal proceedings against
Marín for entering the United States without a valid
entry document pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(7)(A)(i) (I). Marín conceded removability and
subsequently applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT on the grounds that Cuellar's
threats constituted persecution based on the social group of
his family and demonstrated the likelihood that Marín
would be tortured or killed if he returned to Guatemala. An
IJ denied Marín's application and Marín
sought review before the BIA. The BIA affirmed, adopting
some, but not all, of the IJ's reasoning. This timely
petition followed.
II.
When
the BIA incorporates portions of the IJ's opinion and
also supplies its own analysis, we review the decisions
together. Dimova v. Holder, 783 F.3d 30, 35 (1st
Cir. 2015). We review questions of fact under the deferential
"substantial evidence" standard, and we "will
affirm unless 'any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.'"
Tobón-Marín v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 28,
30 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
Marín does not make any arguments regarding the
BIA's disposition of his CAT claim. We therefore view
that claim as abandoned and review only his asylum and
withholding of removal claims. See Rotinsulu v.
Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2008).
An
asylum applicant bears the burden of proving he is a refugee.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(a). As defined in INA section 101(a)(42)(A), a
refugee is someone "who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, [his or her native country] because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A). "The statute contemplates two approaches
which petitioners might pursue to satisfy their burden of
proof." Tobón-Marín, 512 F.3d at 31.
First, petitioners may prove that "they have suffered
from past persecution on account of one or more of the five
grounds enumerated in § 1101(a)(42)(A), which proof
would generate a rebuttable presumption that their fear of
future persecution is well-founded." Butt v.
Keisler,506 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). Second, petitioners may show that "their ...