United States District Court, D. Rhode Island
STEVEN J. McAULIFFE, District Judge
Before the court are motions to dismiss the first amended complaints filed by all defendants who were served in either of these consolidated cases. See Doc. Nos. 89, 91-93, in Seguin v. Textron, No. 13-cv-12-SJM ("Textron"); Doc. No. 46, in Seguin v. Suttell, No. 13-cv-095-JNL ("Suttell")). Seguin has not filed a timely objection to any of those defendants' motions to dismiss, and she has neither served, nor demonstrated good cause for failing to serve, any of the remaining defendants named in the First Amended Complaint in Suttell or the First Amended Complaint in Textron.
For reasons stated below, this court grants each motion to dismiss. The court also grants Seguin fourteen days to show cause why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), as to the remaining defendants named in the First Amended Complaints in Textron and Suttell who were not served with those pleadings. See Textron Doc. No. 66 (First Am. Compl.); Suttell Doc. No. 25.
These consolidated cases represent the third and fourth federal actions filed by plaintiff, Mary Seguin ("Seguin"), in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, concerning Rhode Island Family Court litigation involving Seguin and Gero Meyersiek or Marc Seguin, the fathers of her two daughters (hereinafter "Family Court proceedings"). Those Family Court proceedings, as well as other state court cases Seguin filed to challenge orders in those proceedings, are described in Seguin v. Chafee, No. 12-cv-708-JD, 2012 WL 6553621, at *1-*3 (D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2012).
In the two prior federal cases filed by Seguin in the District of Rhode Island, Seguin v. Bedrosian, No. 12-cv-614-JD-LM (D.R.I.) ("Bedrosian"), and Seguin v. Chafee, No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I.) ("Chafee"), Seguin asserted similar claims, alleging that various orders in the Family Court proceedings were fraudulent and interfered with her parental rights and right to travel. She also claimed, among other things, that biased state court judges and others conspired to violate her rights; that the orders issued in those cases were retaliatory for misconduct reports Seguin filed, or manifested the judges' discriminatory intent; and that she was deprived of due process of law in the state courts. The relief sought in Chafee and Bedrosian included declaratory relief and orders enjoining the Family Court proceedings, as well as damages. In December 2012 and January 2013, the Chafee and Bedrosian courts dismissed all of Seguin's claims upon finding that abstention was mandatory as to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and that, even if Younger did not apply, Seguin failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Bedrosian, No. 12-cv-614-JD-LM, 2013 WL 367722, at *3 (D.R.I. Jan. 30, 2013), aff'd, No. 13-1242 (1st Cir. Nov. 1, 2013); Chafee, No. 12-cv-704-JD-LM, 2012 WL 6553621, at *7 (Dec. 14, 2012), recons. denied, 2013 WL 124301 (D.R.I. Jan. 9, 2013), aff'd, No. 13-1241 (1st Cir. Nov. 1, 2013).
Seguin asserts in the pleadings in these consolidated cases that judges in the Family Court proceedings issued child support orders and other rulings favorable to Gero Meyersiek that violated her rights. She has further alleged that she and Meyersiek are former Textron employees, who were involved in a sexual relationship when they worked together. Textron's settlement agreements with Meyersiek and/or Seguin are cited by plaintiff in these cases, in connection with her allegations that child support orders in the Family Court proceedings manifest corruption and bias, and/or that Textron, Gero Meyersiek, and others participated in corrupt, conspiratorial, and fraudulent acts affecting her interests in those proceedings. Seguin specifically highlights a Family Court order issued on a petition stating that Seguin's mother does not speak English as proof of that court's bias and discriminatory intent, and she claims that Textron and/or Gero Meyersiek conspired together with state court judges and others to deprive her of due process, in a manner she characterizes as fraudulent and corrupt. She further alleges that various federal and state government officials have not adequately investigated or prosecuted her complaints. Her assertions in all these respects are substantially similar to the claims she asserted in Chafee and Bedrosian. Seguin seeks damages, this court's referral of defendants for criminal prosecutions, rescission of the Textron settlement agreement, and restitution.
I. Motion to Dismiss Standard
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must consider whether the factual content in the complaint and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, taken as true, state a facially plausible claim to relief. Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor , 723 F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In doing so, the court disregards any legal conclusions in the complaint. Hernandez-Cuevas , 723 F.3d at 102-03. The court is generally limited to considering "facts and documents that are part of or incorporated into the complaint, '" as well as "documents incorporated by reference in [the complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.'" Giragosian v. Ryan , 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). As Seguin is proceeding pro se in this action, the court must construe her pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
II. Suttell Amended Complaint
The Suttell defendants served in this action ("State Defendants") - Bedrosian, Capinieri, Chafee, Constantino, Forte, Giarrusso, Glucksman, Kilmartin, McCann, Santilli, and Suttell -contend that the claims Seguin has asserted against them in the operative complaint in Suttell (see First Am. Compl., Suttell Doc. No. 25) must be dismissed. Those Suttell defendants argue that dismissal is required because plaintiff is simply relitigating claims rejected for failure to state a plausible claim in Chafee and Bedrosian.
A. Res Judicata
"Under the federal law of claim preclusion, " or res judicata, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating claims that were raised or could have been raised in that action.'" Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc. , 699 F.3d 38, ...